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INTRODUCTION
Mrs. B is an African-American woman with a short, sassy haircut and
a feisty disposition to match. She was born and raised in Detroit, Michigan,
where she and her husband are now raising their seven children. Many
Detroit residents have fled to surrounding suburbs as a result of Detroit’s
slow economic decline, which began with the dramatic loss of manufacturing
jobs in America’s auto industry and concluded with the largest municipal
bankruptcy in U.S. history. Undeterred, Mrs. B, her family, and many others
like them stayed and braced themselves through the hard times because they
did not want to leave their beloved city. But, now that the city is experiencing
economic resurgence, city officials are kicking people like Mrs. B out of their
homes.
In 2012, Mrs. B and her family were finally able to savor their very own
sumptuous slice of the American Dream. After battling economic insecurity
for decades, Mrs. B and her husband saved enough money to purchase their
first home for $20,000 through a land contract from a company called Dream
Homes Ventures.1 They put $5,000 down and made monthly payments of
1
In a land contract, the seller finances the sale instead of the bank, and buyers pay monthly
installments, similar to rent. Unlike a traditional rental contract, buyers give the sellers a down payment,
assume responsibility for all repairs, and are not safeguarded by the warranty of habitability or any other
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$500. According to the land contract, property taxes and water were included
in the monthly payment,2 but Dream Home Ventures did not, in fact, pay the
taxes. In 2014, Mrs. B received a letter from the Wayne County Treasurer
stating that they owed $9,000 in taxes accrued from 2010 to 2014.
To make matters worse, the property tax bill was illegally high.
Michigan’s constitution, legislation, and supporting case law clearly state
that local authorities cannot assess properties at more than 50% of their
market value.3 The Detroit assessor claimed Mrs. B’s home was worth about
$46,000,4 although she purchased it for $20,000 in an open market
transaction and other homes in her neighborhood sold for approximately that
much money. The overinflated property tax assessments led to illegally high
property tax bills.5 Although Mrs. B repeatedly said that, in Detroit, “our
taxes are too damn high,” she did not know that she could appeal her taxes
to gain relief. She was unable to pay the inflated property tax bill, so in 2015,

legal doctrine that protects consumers from low-quality housing unfit for habitation. Michigan law does
not require land contract sellers to have homes appraised or to disclose debts or liens on the property, and
this lack of regulation leaves Detroiters vulnerable to predatory sellers who target low information, firsttime homebuyers. See Joel Kurth, Loose Regulations Make Land Contracts a Tool to Exploit Low-Income
Homeowners, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (published May 20, 2017, 10:13 PM; updated May 24, 2017),
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20170521/NEWS/170529985/loose-regulations-make-landcontracts-a-tool-to-exploit-low-income [https://perma.cc/B2JJ-U73A] (noting absence of any Michigan
law requiring land contract sellers to disclose debts and liens or have homes appraised before sales).
2
Research shows that people pay more attention to their property taxes and are more likely to protest
inequality when they pay their taxes directly to the state as opposed to a bank paying the property taxes
on their behalf through an escrow account or some other mechanism. See Andrew T. Hayahsi, The Legal
Salience of Taxation, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1443, 1443 (2014) (“I find that reducing property tax salience
makes homeowners less likely to appeal their property-value assessments, making it more likely that
homeowners will remain overassessed and overtaxed. These overtaxed homeowners never perceive—are
never able to ‘name’—their injury and consequently never obtain the relief to which they might be
entitled. Moreover, I show that the selective use of appeals caused by legal salience shifts the tax burden
to racial minorities, immigrants, and working families with children.”).
3
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27a(1) (2018); C.A.F. Inv. Co. v. Mich. State
Tax Comm’n, 221 N.W.2d 588, 591–92 (Mich. 1974); see also Great Lakes Div. of Nat’l Steel Corp. v.
City of Ecorse, 576 N.W.2d 667, 672 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (“True cash value is synonymous with fair
market value.”). To determine the market value of residential properties, the local assessor analyzes recent
sales of comparable properties. See INT’L ASSOC. OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, STANDARD ON MASS
APPRAISAL OF REAL PROPERTY 9 (2013), https://www.iaao.org/media/standards/MARP_2013.
pdf [https://perma.cc/HCW9-SX82].
4
Which in 2015 amounted to a State Equalized Value (SEV) of $22,838. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 211.27a(1) (2018).
5
Michigan authorities calculate property tax bills by multiplying the assessed value of a property
(minus any exemptions) by the property tax rate. See MICH. LEGISLATURE, MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S
GUIDE 2016: REFERENCE FOR THE 2015 TAX YEAR 1–4 (2016), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/
publications/TaxpayerGuide2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BL8X-23QD]
[hereinafter
MICHIGAN
TAXPAYER’S GUIDE] (describing method for calculating tax and some exemptions). If the assessed values
of homes are too high, then the resulting property tax bills will also be inflated.
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Wayne County foreclosed, gained title to Mrs. B’s home, and sold it at
auction for $500.
The most heartbreaking part of the story is that Mrs. B and her family
live under the federal poverty threshold and hence qualify for the Poverty
Tax Exemption, which means that they were not supposed to be paying the
property taxes that led to their eviction in the first place. But, due to poor
advertising and several unnecessary hurdles erected by the City of Detroit,
Mrs. B and her husband were not aware of the exemption.6
In prior work, I investigated property tax injustice in the City of Detroit,
which is located in Michigan’s Wayne County.7 I found that, between 2009
and 2015, the City of Detroit assessed 55%–85% of its residential properties
at over 50% of their market values in violation of the Michigan Constitution.8
Due to the resulting illegally inflated property tax bills that Mrs. B and many
other Detroit homeowners could not afford to pay, between 2011 and 2015,
the Wayne County treasurer foreclosed upon one in four of all homes in
Detroit for nonpayment of property taxes.9 One of the last times that
Americans witnessed this accelerated rate of property tax foreclosures was
during the Great Depression.10
There have been several attempts to hold authorities accountable for
this monumental property tax injustice, including a class action lawsuit filed
on July 13, 2016 by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of
Michigan along with the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.,
and the law firm of Covington & Burling.11 In Morningside Community v.
Sabree, one of the plaintiffs’ allegations is that Wayne County’s property tax
foreclosure practices violate the Fair Housing Act (FHA) because they
disparately impact African-Americans homeowners, causing them to “lose
their homes through tax foreclosure at a higher rate than non-African6

See Complaint ¶¶ 2, 8, Morningside Cmty. Org. v. Sabree, No. 16-008807-CH (Mich. Cir. Ct. July
13, 2016).
7
See Bernadette Atuahene & Timothy R. Hodge, Stategraft, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 263 (2018).
8
Id., at 13.
9
See generally Alex Alsup, A Recent History of Tax Foreclosure, LOVELAND BLOG (Nov. 9, 2015),
https://makeloveland.com/blog/a-recent-history-of-tax-foreclosure
[https://perma.cc/FXF9-XYZ3]
(describing Detroit’s foreclosure crisis); Archival Tax Foreclosures in Detroit, 2002–2013, DATA
DRIVEN DETROIT, http://bit.ly/2bpFd8A [https://perma.cc/AQ99-ZQHR] (identifying properties in
Detroit that were listed in a tax foreclosure auction between 2002 and 2013). The city’s published file on
their open data portal has 382,051 records. See Parcel Map, CITY OF DETROIT (published Feb. 4, 2015;
updated
Jan.
2,
2018),
https://data.detroitmi.gov/Property-Parcels/Parcel-Map/fxkw-udwf
[https://perma.cc/5BEQ-RJDY] (enter “table view” to see number of property records maintained by
city).
10
See David C. Wheelock, The Federal Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Lessons from the
Great Depression, 90 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 133, 138–39 (2008).
11
See Complaint, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 252–59.
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American homeowners in Wayne County.”12 The plaintiffs brought the case
in the Wayne County Circuit Court, but Judge Robert Colombo dismissed
the FHA claim, ruling that it should have been brought in the Michigan Tax
Tribunal.13 On September 21, 2017, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court’s finding of improper jurisdiction.14 On November 1, 2017,
plaintiffs asked the Michigan Supreme Court to hear an appeal, which the
court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on January 24, 2018.15
Although this challenge was not successful, this Essay builds on my initial
study of unconstitutional property tax assessments in Detroit to explore
whether unconstitutional tax assessments and the resulting tax foreclosures
in Wayne County violate the FHA in the hope that a future court might take
it up.
The Morningside plaintiffs’ FHA claim relied on the disparate impact
theory of equal protection, which is dead in constitutional jurisprudence, but
alive and well in the areas of the law where the legislature intervened, such
as the FHA.16 Disparate treatment requires plaintiffs to show that the
discriminatory act was intentional, while disparate impact analysis bypasses
intent-based queries to focus instead on the policy’s discriminatory effect.17
12

Id. ¶ 256.
Morningside Cmty. Org.v. Wayne Cty Treasurer, No. 336430, 2017 WL 4182985, at *3 (Mich.
Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2017) (per curiam) (explaining the trial court’s reasoning); see also Mackenzie Walz,
Morningside Community Organization v. Sabree, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE (Mar. 6,
2018), https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15427 [https://perma.cc/UC7Z-4FNX].
14
Morningside Cmty. Org., 2017 WL 4182985, at *1.
15
Morningside Cmty Org. v. Wayne Cty. Treasurer, 905 N.W.2d 597, 598 (Mich. 2018).
16
Prior to 1976, the disparate impact theory of equal protection required plaintiffs to prove that a
law, policy, or practice had a discriminatory effect on a protected class. In 1976, the Supreme Court
sidelined the disparate impact theory and ruled in Washington v. Davis that a violation of the
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause necessitates a showing of disparate treatment, requiring plaintiffs
to prove that the decision in question was motivated by a discriminatory purpose or intent. Disparate
impact now only comes into play when a discriminatory purpose motivates the decision. See generally
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003)
(examining whether equal protection affirmatively forbids the use of statutory disparate impact
standards); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of
Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357 (2013)
(discussing the history of disparate impact claims in recent FHA cases).
17
See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977)
(“When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this
judicial deference [to decisions of legislative and administrative bodies] is no longer justified.”);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247–48 (1976) (“[Title VII] involves a more probing judicial review
of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is
appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is
claimed. We are not disposed to adopt this more rigorous standard for the purposes of applying the Fifth
and the Fourteenth Amendments in cases such as this.”). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987), for an application of this doctrine to capital punishment sentences. Plaintiffs presented the court
with the Baldus study, which used 2,000 murder sentencings delivered between 1973 and 1979 to
investigate whether a victim’s race affected Georgia prosecutors’ and juries’ decisions to seek and impose
13
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This Essay marshals social science evidence to make an actionable claim of
racial discrimination based upon a theory of disparate impact. In Part I, I
explain the property tax assessment and foreclosure processes in the City of
Detroit and Wayne County. Part II explores whether the FHA applies to
property tax administration and, more specifically, to unconstitutional tax
assessments and the resulting property tax foreclosures in Wayne County. I
explain the methodology used in Part III. Part IV analyzes assessment and
foreclosure data, which show clearly that Wayne County’s predominately
African-American cities experience unconstitutional property tax
assessments and tax foreclosures at a far greater rate than its predominately
white cities. The final section concludes.
Most importantly, this Essay shows that the property tax malfeasance
occurring in Wayne County is a quintessential example of institutional
racism, which is when the laws, policies, or practices of any institution or
group of institutions intentionally or unintentionally results in race-based
inequities or discrimination.18 As opposed to individual racism—where
people discriminate based on the conscious or unconscious belief that one
race is superior to another—the perpetrators of the harm are not readily
identifiable individuals who society can resolutely condemn. The
perpetrators instead are an institution or assortment of institutions. The
Detroit Assessment Division, the Wayne County Equalization Division, and
the Wayne County Treasurer are the government agencies directly at fault.
But, there are also several other actors implicated in the malfeasance. The
State of Michigan, for example, under-funded its cities,19 leaving many cities
the death penalty. The study found that—even when controlling for thirty-nine nonracial variables that
play a role in capital punishment sentences—a death sentence was 4.3 times more likely for defendants
who killed whites than those who killed African-Americans. Assuming the evidence of racial disparity
was correct, the court nonetheless ruled that there was no constitutional violation because the plaintiff
failed to prove that the officials who produced McCleskey’s sentence intended to discriminate based on
race. Id. at 319.
18
Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 (2000) (attempting to define institutional racism as a process
that is created “through the operation of various mental processes. [sic] frequently repeated patterns of
activity relatively quickly take on an unexamined, rule-like status such that they are spontaneously
followed and disrupted only with difficulty”); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial
Goodwill Isn’t Enough, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1, 22 (1999) (“[Institutional racism, contrasted to individual
racism,] is less overt, far more subtle, less identifiable in terms of specific individuals committing the
acts. But it is no less destructive of human life. The second type originates in the operation of established
and respected forces in the society . . . .”); Brian J. Sutherland, Comment, Killing Jim Crow and the
Undead Nondelegation Doctrine with Privately Enforceable Federal Regulations, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
917, 921 (2006) (“Institutional racism is racial discrimination perpetrated whether intentionally or not
within the policies, practices, procedures, laws, rules, or regulations of any public or private institution.
It is the legacy of American slavery and a lingering obstacle to true racial equality in this country.”).
19
Christina Hall, 14 Cities Sue Michigan, Say Revenue-Sharing Math Isn’t Right, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (published Sept. 9, 2016, 12:28 PM; updated Sept. 9, 2016, 3:25 PM), https://www.freep.com/
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financially vulnerable and predisposed to predatory, covert revenue-raising
tactics such as illegally inflated property tax assessments. Also, Detroit
experienced the largest municipal bankruptcy in American history,
restructuring over eighteen billion dollars in debt and long-term liabilities.20
During the city’s financial crisis, the governor-appointed emergency
manager, Kevyn Orr, imposed austerity measures upon the City of Detroit,
which further crippled its ability to invest in the bureaucratic infrastructure
necessary to ensure property tax assessments were in line with the Michigan
Constitution.21 In addition, Detroit’s Assessment Division did not have the
capacity to deal with the steep 2008 drop in home values precipitated by the
predatory lending practices of banks and the resulting subprime mortgage
crisis.22 Given the complex reasons behind the property tax malfeasance, the
perpetrators of the harm are dispersed, fractionated, and thus invisible—
hidden in plain sight. But, African-American homeowners suffered
disproportionately from the malfeasance, so the victims are manifest and
unmistakable, making this a casebook example of institutional racism.
I.

PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION IN WAYNE COUNTY23
A. A Primer on Property Tax Calculations in Michigan

Michigan officials are legally required to assess all properties
annually.24 Assessments in Michigan involve three distinct calculations:

story/news/local/michigan/2016/09/09/revenue-sharing-michigan-eastpointe-lawsuit/90118136/
[https://perma.cc/7YX9-3SZG].
20
See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 113 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); James Spiotto, Detroit’s
Bankruptcy Is the Nation’s Largest, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2013/07/18/us/detroit-bankruptcy-is-the-largest-in-nation.html
[https://perma.cc/Y8A3-XNAE]
(reporting that the city’s bankruptcy is the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history in terms of debt).
21
See generally MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1541–.1575 (2018) (“An emergency manager shall
develop and may amend a written financial and operating plan for the local government.”).
22
See generally Douglas S. Massey et al., Riding the Stagecoach to Hell: A Qualitative Analysis of
Racial Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 15 CITY & COMMUNITY 118 (2016) (quantitatively and
qualitatively demonstrating how racialized mechanisms worked to produce cumulative disadvantage for
African-Americans during U.S. housing boom and bust cycles); Jacob S. Rugh et al., Race, Space, and
Cumulative Disadvantage: A Case Study of the Subprime Lending Collapse, 62 SOC. PROBS. 186 (2015)
(describing how residential segregation and racial inequality generate racialized patterns of subprime
lending that led to financial hardship among black borrowers).
23
For a more in-depth description of the practices, see Bernadette Atuahene & Christopher Berry,
Taxed Out: Illegal Property Tax Assessments and the Epidemic of Tax Foreclosures in Detroit
(Mar. 7, 2018) (manuscript with publication schedule forthcoming) (on file with Northwestern University
Law Review).
24
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.10(1) (2018); WM. T. DUST, MANUAL OF THE COMMON COUNCIL AND
OF THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT 29–30 (1886) (stating that the Board of
Assessors has a duty to assess the true cash value of all real and personal property each fiscal year).
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Assessed Value (AV), State Equalized Value (SEV), and Taxable Value
(TV).25
The first calculation is the AV. Each local assessor is required to
conduct sales or appraisal studies to determine the market value of each
property within her jurisdiction.26 The industry standard for appraisals of
residential housing is the market approach,27 which requires assessors to
determine the market value of a property based on the sale price of
comparable properties, taking into consideration factors such as the
property’s size, age, condition, location, existing use, zoning, natural assets,
and present economic income.28 The assessors then set the AV not to exceed
the constitutionally permitted limit of 50% of the property’s determined
market value. That is, according to the Michigan Constitution, for each
taxable property: AV≤Market Value/2.
The second calculation is the SEV. The point of the SEV is to ensure
that the AV is uniform at the city, county, and state levels as mandated by
the Michigan Constitution.29 Calculating the SEV is a two-step process. In
the first step, the county conducts an annual equalization study, which
determines the assessment-to-market ratio in each of its taxing jurisdictions
for each class of property. 30 The goal of county equalization is to bring the
total valuation of each class of property within the county as close to the 50%
constitutional limit as possible.31 If uniformity is not present, then each

25
26

MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S GUIDE, supra note 5, at 1.
Fairplains Twp. v. Montcalm Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 542 N.W.2d 897, 898–99 (Mich. Ct. App.

1995).
27

INT’L ASSOC. OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, supra note 3, at 9.
See Meadowlanes Ltd. Dividend Hous. Ass’n v. City of Holland, 473 N.W.2d 636, 642, 651
(Mich. 1991) (noting that “the appraiser should adjust the sales price of comparables for differences in
size, age, condition, location, and other value influences”); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27(1)
(2018) (describing various factors an assessor should consider in determining “true cash value”);
Antisdale v. City of Galesburg, 362 N.W.2d 632, 638 (Mich. 1984) (“The market approach to value has
the capacity to cure this deficiency because evidence of the sales prices of a number of comparable
properties, if sufficiently similar, supports the conclusion that factors extrinsic to the properties have not
entered into the value placed on the properties by the parties.”); Great Lakes Div. of Nat’l Steel Corp. v.
City of Ecorse, 576 N.W.2d 667, 674, 678–79 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
29
See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (stating that true cash value is the proportion at which property shall
be uniformly assessed); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.34 (2018) (tasking county commissioners “in the
matter of equalization of assessments” in accordance with the Michigan Constitution); DETROIT, MICH.
CODE OF ORDINANCES, Part IV (2017) (citing duties under MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3).
30
MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMM’N, BULLETIN NO. 11 OF 2011, EQUALIZATION PROCESS FOR 2012,
at
1
(2014),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Bulletin11of2011_367617_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48XQ-3VJ3].
31
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27a (2018); Sch. Dist. No. 9 v. Bd. of Supervisors of Washtenaw Cty.,
67 N.W.2d 165, 172 (Mich. 1954) (noting that the purpose of equalization is not only to provide basis for
apportionment of property taxes, but also to “carry out the provisions relating to uniformity of taxation”
28
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county’s board of commissioners can equalize the AV for any class of
property by applying an adjustment factor (also called equalization factor).32
For instance, if the county finds that the average AV for all commercial
properties in one of its cities is well below 50% of the average market value
of all commercial properties in that city, then it can apply a factor to increase
the AV for the entire class of commercial properties. In the second step, the
county sends its equalized values to the state because equalization must also
happen at the state level to ensure that all counties within the state are paying
their fair share of taxes.33 If uniformity is not present, then the State Tax
Commission can apply an adjustment factor to equalize the assessments of
all counties within the state.34 This double-tiered process yields the SEV.
The third calculation is the TV, which is the capped SEV. To prevent
sharp increases in an owner’s property tax bill, the Michigan Constitution
(Proposal A) caps the annual increase in a property’s TV so long as it is
owned by the same person.35 Consequently, if a property’s market value
escalates substantially over the years, then TV will be less than SEV. But,
when the owner transfers her property, Proposal A eliminates the cap and
SEV=TV.36 Most critically, the assessor multiplies the TV by the authorized
contained in the constitution); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 209.41(6) (2009); MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S GUIDE,
supra note 5, at 1.
32
See MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S GUIDE, supra note 5, at 1 (stating the board of commissioners in every
county can apply an equalization factor to assessed values to ensure that property owners pay their fair
share of taxes). Taxpayers can file suit if they believe that the county equalization process is legally
flawed. See Brittany Park Apartments v. Twp. of Harrison, 304 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(alleging that the equalized value exceeded 50% of true cash value, in violation of Art. 9, § 3 of the
Michigan Constitution).
33
MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMM’N, supra note 30.
34
See Ann Arbor Twp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 227 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Mich. 1975) (noting that
previous courts have “said that the ‘process of equalization is designed to enhance the goal of uniformity.’
That goal is achieved by both intra- and inter-county equalization, by uniformity within and between the
counties”) (footnotes omitted).
35
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (“For taxes levied in 1995 and each year thereafter, the legislature shall
provide that the taxable value of each parcel of property adjusted for additions and losses, shall not
increase each year by more than the increase in the immediately preceding year in the general price level,
as defined in section 33 of this article, or 5 percent, whichever is less until ownership of the parcel of
property is transferred. When ownership of the parcel of property is transferred as defined by law, the
parcel shall be assessed at the applicable proportion of current true cash value.”).
36
See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27a(3) (“[T]he property’s
taxable value for the calendar year following the year of the transfer is the property’s state equalized
valuation for the calendar year following the transfer.”); MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMM’N, GUIDE TO
BASIC
ASSESSING
48
(2018),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/
Guide_to_Basic_Assessing_1-16_511508_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/R52B-65QB] (stating that the
following transfers are not considered transfers of ownership: spouse to spouse, tenancy by entireties, life
lease, foreclosure/forfeiture, redemption—forfeited land for non-payment of taxes, conveyance to trust
when beneficiary is same as settlor, court order, joint tenancy, security interest; affiliated group, normal
public trading, common control, tax free reorganization, and relationship by first degree of blood or
affinity to the first degree).
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millage rate to determine the amount of property taxes homeowners owe
annually.37
B. From Assessment to Foreclosure: The Underpinnings of the Property
Tax Foreclosure Crisis in Detroit
Detroit’s Assessments Division determines the assessed, taxable, and
capped values for all classes of property (residential, commercial, personal,
and industrial) with the assistance of computer software.38 Between 2002 and
2003, the Assessments Division decided to switch computer software
systems—from the legacy mainframe system to the Equalizer system—but
the changeover was not done properly. A senior assessment official said, “the
conversion should have happened over several years with officials going into
the field and verifying the information. But, in 2002 things began going south
in Detroit and we did not have the manpower or funding to do the switch
properly.”39 Consequently, significant data were lost because the
Assessments Division only transferred building values to the new Equalizer
system without the underlying data on which the numbers were based.40 After
the Assessments Division bungled the conversion, property descriptions,
property valuations, and other records were inaccurate and incomplete.41
37

See generally MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S GUIDE, supra note 5, at 3–4.
DETROIT OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE FINANCE
DEPARTMENT ASSESSMENTS DIVISION JULY 2008–JUNE 2011, at 3 (Sept. 10, 2012), http://bit.ly/
2hu2XJK [https://perma.cc/XYQ8-D3FV] [hereinafter PERFORMANCE AUDIT] (“The Assessments
Division handles the assessments of all 387,000 parcels of residential, commercial, personal, and
industrial properties in the City of Detroit. They are responsible to discover, identify, record, and annually
determine the assessed, taxable, and capped values for the purpose of levying taxes that generate
substantial revenue for the City.”).
39
Interview with Senior Assessment Official, in Detroit, Mich. (June 15, 2017).
40
Id.; see also PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 38, at 9 (“The Assessments Division maintains
assessment information on manual property record cards and electronically in Equalizer. Several issues
were associated with converting data from the manual property record cards, to IPDS, and subsequently
to Equalizer. Information on property record cards did not match information in the system, or the actual
physical property. Management acknowledged that they have accuracy issues with property information
because of the conversion, economic conditions, and changing property valuations. The result is
inaccurate or incomplete information and errors in property descriptions and valuations in the
Equalizer.”).
41
See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 38, at 10, 17 (“Many exceptions were found during our
review of sales and acquisitions of city-owned property handled by the Planning and Development
Department (P&DD): A majority (or 37 out of 48) of P&DD sales of city-owned property were not
accurately reflected in Equalizer.”); id. at 9–10 (“Prior to the conversion a property listed three
commercial buildings, however, after the conversion the property listed one store, and two apartment
buildings; A vacant lot which still included the original building [and] assessed values were not updated
appropriately; A property that was improperly listed as tax exempt, and the apartment building only had
a base rate of $5 per square feet. The error rate for accuracy of property information on property record
cards (the manual assessing system), as well as information in Equalizer, was greater than 5%, which is
not a passing score according to the Michigan State Tax Commission (STC) . . . . The results of site visits
38
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Consequently, most properties in the Equalizer system were in override,
which in Detroit meant that the assessments were not based on systematically
calculated market values.42 Instead, the assessments were based on
incremental, ad hoc adjustments to existing property values.43
FIGURE 1: MEDIAN SALE PRICE OF SINGLE FAMILY HOMES IN DETROIT (2007–2016)44

SOURCE: ZILLOW, DETROIT, MI HOME VALUE INDEX (SINGLE FAMILY HOMES)45

When property values plummeted in 2008 (see Figure 1), this makeshift
system became sorely unworkable. The City of Detroit was systematically
assessing properties in violation of the Michigan Constitution because it
lacked the personnel to update the market value of properties in its taxing

by the OAG, revealed that for five of the 22 (22.7%) residential properties audited, the actual condition
of the building or property did not match its condition in Equalizer.”).
42
Id. at 9 (“In the City’s electronic assessing system known as ‘Equalizer’, a property is in an
‘override status’ when its assessed value is input as a total amount, versus the system method of
calculating a value based on physical property attributes and other assessment criteria. The property’s
assessed value is ‘disconnected’ in the system. Assessed values in Equalizer are historical aggregate
amounts, which were transferred from the previous assessing system known as ‘IPDS’ (Integrated
Physical Data Systems): Of the 42 properties audited, 28 (66.7%) remain in override status; A
representative in the Assessments Division estimated that 92% of the City’s parcels 387,000 remain in
override status in Equalizer.”).
43
See generally Atuahene & Berry, supra note 23.
44
This figure first appeared in Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 7, and is reprinted with permission
from the Southern California Law Review.
45
See Detroit Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW (last updated Feb. 28, 2018),
http://www.zillow.com/detroit-mi/home-values [https://perma.cc/J23W-ZUSJ].
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jurisdiction as required by law.46 In 2012, Detroit’s auditor general
scrutinized the Assessments Division and found that the average number of
parcels per appraiser was 6,911, which is nearly double the recommended
ratio.47 The personnel shortage also meant that the Assessments Division
could not carry out state-mandated site visits designed to update property
characteristics and values.48 The auditor general found that
[t]he Division does not comply with state requirements or its internal metric to
conduct site visits for 30% of properties annually. Instead, based on our sample,
the average number of years since the last recorded site visits is 22.8 years for
commercial and industrial properties and 30.0 years for residential properties.49

Without annual site visits, both the property records and the assessments
derived from them are inaccurate. 50 The situation worsened in 2013 when
Detroit’s historic bankruptcy left the city even more cash-strapped and
without sufficient resources to conduct basic city services such as fixing
streetlights, hiring police officers, and staffing its Assessments Division.51
46

The Assessments Division was underfunded. See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 38, at 50
(“During the budget hearings, City Council questioned the Assessments Division’s proposed 2010–2011
budget noting that in spite of the Division ‘confronting an increasing caseload of work . . . the Finance
Department asked for fewer resources in terms of full time equivalent (FTE) and dollars than the Mayor’s
recommended budget.’”) (omission in original).
47
Id. (“The Michigan’s State Assessors Board (MSAB) recommends as a general rule, ‘that an
effective assessment system requires one full-time employee, including clericals per 1,500 to 3,500
parcels’. In fiscal year 2010-2011, the Assessments Division had a staff of 52 employees (including one
contractor) versus the approved budget of 56 positions.”).
48
Id. at 11 (“Division Management stated that while their goal is to conduct site reviews of 30% of
all properties annually - it is a goal and not based on actual performance. It was stated that they do not
have staff to routinely do site visits.”). In 2010, the Michigan State Tax Commission sent all municipal
tax assessors a memorandum entitled Property Inspection: “The purpose of this Bulletin is to provide
assessing officers with guidance regarding the inspection of property. As a guideline, the State Tax
Commission recommends that assessors inspect 20% of properties in their local unit annually. Of primary
importance is that assessors have a documented inspection plan that provides for consistent review of all
properties within the local unit over a specified period of time.” MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMM’N,
BULLETIN NO. 2 OF 2014, PROPERTY INSPECTION 1 (2014), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/
treasury/Bulletin2014-2PropertyInspection_447098_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH9K-JYDW].
49
See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 38, at 9.
50
See id. at 11 (“The effect of not conducting the required annual site visits results in detailed
property records (including data in Equalizer), assessments, and the City’s tax rolls that are not accurate.
Assessments can only be as accurate as the property data on which they are based. Understated
assessments results in lost revenues for the City, while overstatements increase revenues at the expense
of property owners.”); see also id. at 36 (“[A]nnual sales studies which are used to determine assessment
ratios and ultimately, assessed values would be adversely affected if data relating to sales is missing or
not accurate.”).
51
Matt Helms et al., 9 Ways Detroit Is Changing After Bankruptcy, DETROIT FREE PRESS (published
Nov. 9, 2014, 12:00 AM; updated Nov. 9, 2014, 1:38 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/
detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/09/detroit-city-services-bankruptcy/18716557
[https://perma.cc/H6U76CZB] (“Average police response times clocked in at almost an hour. Tens of thousands of broken
streetlights meant entire streets go dark at nightfall. And though Detroit has more than 200 municipal
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In 2014, in response to the damning exposé report written by Detroit’s
own auditor general, the Michigan State Tax Commission took control of
Detroit’s Assessments Division because of “widespread over-assessments
and rampant tax delinquencies.”52 In addition, in 2015, the Michigan State
Tax Commission created the Audit of the Minimum Assessing Requirements
(AMAR), which is its mechanism for ensuring that local assessing units are
following Michigan laws and devising corrective action plans to address any
discovered deficiencies.53 With the exception of Detroit, all local units in
Wayne County went through the AMAR in 2015.54
In addition to the state tax commission’s efforts to ensure accuracy, if
taxpayers believe that the local assessor has overassessed them, they have a
right to appeal. In Detroit, homeowners must first submit an appeal with the
Board of Assessors between February 1 and February 15 of each tax year.55
If the homeowner is not satisfied with the Board of Assessors’ decision,
then she can appeal to the Board of Review, which conducts hearings in
March. 56 If she is still not satisfied, the homeowner can file an appeal with

parks, the city could only afford to keep about a quarter of them open.”). Although some funding of public
services in some neighborhoods may have been restored, other neighborhoods have yet to see this type
of attention. See Quinn Klinefelter, Post-Bankruptcy, a Booming Detroit Is Still Fragile, NPR (Dec. 12,
2015, 5:06 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/12/12/459192004/post-bankruptcy-a-booming-detroit-is-stillfragile [https://perma.cc/GV3S-C2WS].
52
See Christine Ferretti, State Lifts Oversight of Detroit Property Assessments, DETROIT NEWS (Aug.
30, 2017, 6:23 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2017/08/30/state-liftsoversight-detroit-property-assessments/105130886 [https://perma.cc/ZWF9-FEJY].
53
See MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMM’N, AUDIT OF MINIMUM ASSESSING REQUIREMENTS AMAR
REVIEW
SHEET
(2017),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/
AMAR_Adopted_9-18-17_with_Hyperlinks_601914_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6C6-38EX].
54
An AMAR report in Detroit would have been duplicative because, as part of the city’s corrective
action plan, the STC mandated a complete reappraisal of properties in its jurisdiction and regular progress
reports. To review all AMAR reports for Wayne County, see Local Audit and Finance Division –
Document Search, MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, (2015), https://treas-secure.state.mi.us/LAFDocSearch
[https://perma.cc/ZWF9-FEJY] (search county field for “Wayne”).
55
DETROIT, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-9-3 (1964) (“The period for the review by the board
of assessors shall be February first (1st) to February fifteenth (15th), inclusive, each year.”).
Notwithstanding, in past years, the City of Detroit has lengthened the assessor’s review period from
January 25 to February 18. See Joe Guillen, Detroit Extends Time to Appeal Property Valuation, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (published Feb. 13, 2017, 1:15 PM; updated Feb. 13, 2017, 7:21 PM),
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2017/02/13/detroit-extends-time-appealproperty-valuation/97850946 [https://perma.cc/97HP-GB5V] (due to late property assessment
determinations, the city extended the assessment review period to allow for same two-week opportunity
to challenge property valuation). Property classified as commercial, industrial, or utility can appeal
directly to the Michigan Tax Tribunal. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 205.735a(4)(a) (2008).
56
See DETROIT, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-9-7 (1964); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 211.28–30 (2018) (the entire membership of the board of review is responsible for reviewing the
assessment roll to ensure the assessments are equitable and the capped and taxable valuations are
properly calculated).
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the Michigan Tax Tribunal by July 30 of the tax year under protest.57 Only if
the Tax Tribunal has committed “fraud, error of law, or the adoption of
wrong principles,” can taxpayers appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals
and then the state supreme court.58
Although an appeal process exists, for poor and working-class families
who have limited time, low information, and insufficient monetary resources
to hire an advocate, the appeal process can be inaccessible, opaque, and
onerous. Consequently, only a small fraction of homeowners appeal their
property taxes. Instead, the majority of taxpayers in Detroit and other Wayne
County municipalities have paid inflated property tax bills based upon
unconstitutional assessments, and when they cannot afford to pay, they face
foreclosure.
In a recent study, Christopher Berry and I measure the impact of
unconstitutional property tax assessments on tax foreclosure rates in
Detroit.59 Controlling for purchase price, location, and time-of-sale, we
demonstrate that properties assessed at higher rates were more likely to
experience a subsequent tax foreclosure. We estimate that 10% of all tax
foreclosures were caused by unconstitutional tax assessments. Moreover,
since lower-priced homes were over-assessed at a greater frequency and
magnitude than higher-priced homes, we estimate that 25% of tax
foreclosures among homes less than $8,000 in sale price were due to
unconstitutional property tax assessments. There is an undeniable link
between illegally inflated tax assessments and tax foreclosures.
Wayne County’s tax foreclosure process is fairly straightforward.
According to the Delinquent Property Tax Foreclosure Public Act (1999),
delinquent properties are forfeited to the Wayne County treasurer in their
second year of delinquency, and the foreclosure process begins if the
property taxes remain unpaid on March 31 in their third year of
delinquency.60 The Wayne County treasurer can sell the property to the state,
county, or city government for the cost of all unpaid taxes, interest, and fees

57
See, Property Assessment Appeal Information, CITY OF DETROIT, http://www.detroitmi.gov/HowDo-I/Appeal/Property-Assessment-Appeal-Information [https://perma.cc/3F74-JM86].
58
See MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 28 (“In the absence of fraud, error of law or the adoption of wrong
principles, no appeal may be taken to any court from any final agency provided for the administration of
property tax laws from any decision relating to valuation or allocation.”).
59
Atuahene & Berry, supra note 23.
60
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.78g (2015). Also, Wayne County can choose to accelerate the
foreclosure process for abandoned properties. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.963 (1999) (“Therefore, the
local unit of government hereby notifies residents and owners of property within the local unit of
government that abandoned tax delinquent property will be identified and inspected and may be certified
as certified abandoned property under the certification of abandoned property for accelerated forfeiture
act and subject to accelerated forfeiture and foreclosure under the general property tax act.”).
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owed to other governmental entities.61 The unsold properties go first to the
Wayne County auction, where the minimum bid is all unpaid taxes, interest,
and fees.62 The unsold properties from the first auction then go to the second
one, where the opening bid is $500.63 Unsold properties from the second
auction are owned by the Wayne County Treasurer, unless the city accepts
them.64
In sum, this Section documents the process from a property’s
assessment to its foreclosure, highlighting the origins of unconstitutional
property tax assessments and their outsized role in Detroit’s unprecedented
tax foreclosure rates. The next Part discusses the FHA and its applicability
to property tax administration in Wayne County.
II. FAIR HOUSING ACT (FHA)
Housing discrimination ails America’s democracy, and the Fair
Housing Act (FHA) is the federal government’s primary legislative cure.65
The FHA was enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and
stands as one of the Civil Rights Movement’s crowning achievements.66 The
FHA’s initial goal was to end discrimination based on race, color, religion,
and national origin in the sale, rental, and financing of dwellings.67 In 1974,
61

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.78m(1) (2015).
Id. § 211.78m(2).
63
See id. § 211.78m(5) (allowing county to establish a reasonable opening bid to recover cost of
sale); Margaret Dewar et al., Disinvesting in the City: The Role of Tax Foreclosure in Detroit, 51 URB .
AFF. REV. 587, 591 (2015) (noting that Wayne County has set $500 as cost recovery amount).
64
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.78m(6).
65
See generally Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective,
8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969) (describing the legislative history of Title VIII); Joshua L. Farrell, The
FHA’s Origins: How Its Valuation Method Fostered Racial Segregation and Suburban Sprawl, 11 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 374 (2002) (discussing FHA’s history); Charles McCurdy
Mathias, Jr. & Marion Morris, Fair Housing Legislation: Not an Easy Row to Hoe, 4 CITYSCAPE 21
(1999) (discussing the history of the passage of the FHA); Jonathan Zasloff, The Secret History of the
Fair Housing Act, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 247 (2016) (discussing the political deal-making surrounding
the drafting and passage of the FHA).
66
See generally Charles M. Lamb, Congress, the Courts, and Civil Rights: The Fair Housing Act of
1968 Revisited, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1115 (1982) (discussing the history of the drafting and passage of FHA
in relation to the Civil Rights Movement); Wilhelmina A. Leigh, Civil Rights Legislation and the Housing
Status of Black Americans: An Overview, 19 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 5 (1991) (discussing the state of
discrimination and racial segregation in housing during and after the Civil Rights Movement and the
impact of the FHA).
67
See Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970) (prior to 1988 amendment) (“[I]t shall be
unlawful—(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for
the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race,
color, religion, or national origin.”); see also id. § 3605 (prior to 1988 amendment) (“[I]t shall be unlawful
for any bank, building and loan association, insurance company or other corporation, association, firm or
enterprise whose business consists in whole or in part in the making of commercial real estate loans, to
deny a loan or other financial assistance to a person applying therefor for the purpose of purchasing,
62
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Congress added sex to the list of protected categories.68 In 1988, Congress
enacted further amendments to the FHA, ratcheting up the federal
government’s efforts to eradicate housing discrimination.69 The amendments
strengthened enforcement of the FHA, added handicap and familial status to
the list of protected categories, provided monetary damages for victims of
discriminatory housing practices, and extended the FHA’s reach beyond
financing to all residential real estate-related transactions.70 More
importantly, the amendments explicitly authorize the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to create
regulations for the implementation of the FHA.71 So long as HUD’s
regulations reflect a reasonable construction of the law, courts are required
to give them “great weight.”72
But, in spite of the FHA, housing discrimination has continued,
especially for African-Americans. The average white person in metropolitan
American lives in a neighborhood that is 75% white, whereas a typical
African-American lives in a neighborhood that is only 35% white and as
much as 45% black, which is not much different from the situation in 1940.73
constructing, improving, repairing or maintaining a dwelling, or to discriminate against him in the fixing
of the amount, interest rate, duration, or other terms or conditions of such loan or other financial
assistance, because of the race, color, religion, or national origin of such person or of any person
associated with him in connection with such loan or other financial assistance . . . .”).
68
See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808, 88 Stat. 633,
728–29 (1974) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 3605, 3606, 3631).
69
See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988).
70
See James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of
Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1092–98 (1989).
71
See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 13(b), 102 Stat. 1636 (1988)
(“In consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies, the Secretary shall, not later than the 180th day
after the enactment of this Act . . . , issue rules to implement Title VIII . . . as amended by this Act . . . .”);
Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3283 (Jan. 23, 1989)
(“This part provides the Department’s interpretation of the coverage of the Fair Housing Act regarding
discrimination related to the sale or rental of dwellings, the provision of services in connection therewith,
and the availability of residential real estate-related transactions.”). See generally 24 C.F.R. §§ 0–93
(2017) (HUD regulations regarding housing).
72
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972); see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S.
280, 287–88 (2003) (holding that the court will rely on HUD regulations in determining the extent to
which the FHA provides for vicarious liability); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971)
(“The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, having enforcement responsibility, has issued
guidelines interpreting § 703(h) to permit only the use of job-related tests. The administrative
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference . . . . Since the Act and its
legislative history support the Commission’s construction, this affords good reason to treat the guidelines
as expressing the will of Congress.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)); NAACP v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 300 (7th Cir. 1992).
73
See JOHN R. LOGAN & BRIAN J. STULTS, US2010 PROJECT, THE PERSISTENCE OF SEGREGATION
IN THE METROPOLIS: NEW FINDINGS FROM THE 2010 CENSUS 2 (2011), https://s4.ad.brown.edu/
Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/report2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPC8-ACM6] (analyzing data from 1940–
2010 to determine changes and trends in racial residential segregation over the past several decades); see
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African-Americans still live segregated away from whites even fifty
years after the passage of the FHA due, in part, to housing discrimination,
which has evolved throughout the years. Initially, race was often an explicit
reason for exclusion. For example, in one case reaching the Supreme Court,
a community in Virginia prohibited an African-American family from using
the community park and playground facilities to which their residence
granted them access simply because of their race.74 In 1969, the Court ruled
that this blunt form of racism was a clear violation of the FHA.75
As the decades progressed, the denial of housing opportunities was
usually no longer overtly based on race, but instead based on the more
complex intersection of race, gender, and class.76 The FHA, however, is
capacious enough to address racial discrimination that is both overt and
covert. For instance, in 1974, the town of Black Jack, Missouri passed an
ordinance preventing the construction of an affordable housing complex
called Park View Heights in a middle-class suburb of St. Louis that was 99%
white.77 The Eighth Circuit ruled that this action disparately impacted lowincome African-Americans’ access to suburban housing in violation of the
FHA.78 Likewise, lawmakers in Huntington, New York restricted private
multifamily housing projects to the two areas of the town occupied primarily
by minorities, denying low-income minorities access to predominately white
areas. 79 In 1988, the Second Circuit ruled that the ordinance had a disparate
impact on minorities and thus was a violation of the FHA.80
also Camille Zubrinsky Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29 ANN. REV. SOC.
167 (2003); Douglas E. Mitchell et al., The Contributions of School Desegregation to Housing
Integration: Case Studies in Two Large Urban Areas, 45 URB. EDUC. 166 (2010) (discussing resistance
to residential desegregation after the civil rights era, resulting in limited desegregation in some cities).
74
See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1969).
75
See id. at 236 (“What we have here is a device functionally comparable to a racially restrictive
covenant, the judicial enforcement of which was struck down in Shelley v. Kraemer . . . .”).
76
Intersectionality is a social justice theory advancing the idea that gender, race, and class are
interconnected and operate in society as “intersecting oppressions.” See generally Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) (outlining the
framework of intersectionality); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1245–46 (1991) (stating the
struggles created by poverty are often exacerbated by racial discrimination in housing policies).
77
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1181–83 (8th Cir. 1974).
78
Id. at 1188.
79
See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d,
488 U.S. 15 (1988) (examining how exclusionary zoning that prevents construction of multifamily units
in predominately white areas promotes housing segregation by isolating minorities and low-income
residences from areas with white residents and their higher-valued properties).
80
See id. at 938–39 (finding the city’s zoning policy caused disproportionate harm to black residents,
perpetuated racial segregation for the entire community, and its aims could have been achieved using less
discriminatory means); see also Mhany Mgt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 606–16 (2d Cir.
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In this Part, I explore how litigators can use the FHA to address the
property tax foreclosure crisis in Wayne County. Section A reviews existing
case law to determine whether the FHA applies to property tax
administration. Section B investigates if systemic unconstitutional property
tax assessments and the resulting foreclosures can withstand the stringent
disparate impact analysis required by the FHA. Section C explains how
discriminatory property tax administration in Wayne County violates FHA
§§ 3404 and 3405. Finally, Section D discusses which courts litigators can
approach to file a FHA claim.
A. FHA’s Applicability to Property Tax Administration
1.

Does Case Law Indicate that Property Tax Administration Is
Covered by the FHA?
There are only a few cases that explicitly discuss whether the FHA
applies to property tax administration. In 1999, a New York trial court’s
decision in Coleman v. Seldin stated that the FHA does apply.81 Nassau
County’s policy was to assess homes based on the cost to build the home in
1938 rather than based on its current market value.82 This policy disparately
impacted poor and minority homeowners because market values for houses
in affluent (mostly white) areas increased markedly, resulting in drastic
underassessment, while market values in low-income (mostly black) areas
remained stable or declined, resulting in overassessment.83 The court
declared that since the FHA is a broad, antidiscrimination statute, there is no
valid distinction between assessment practices and other practices that courts
have consistently ruled fall within the FHA’s purview, such as zoning
policies.84 Consequently, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss
the FHA claim. Shortly before the trial was to begin, the parties entered into
a consent decree which required Nassau County to adopt a new system for
assessing property that was nondiscriminatory and based on fair market

2016) (deciding that the abandonment of multi-family residential zoning in favor of residential townhouse
zoning was driven by racial animus and thus violated the disparate treatment component of the Fair
Housing Act).
81
See 687 N.Y.S.2d 240, 250 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (“This Court concludes that the FHA applies to the
real property assessment policies, procedures and conditions practiced and imposed by the defendants
herein.”).
82
See id. at 252.
83
See id. at 247–48.
84
See id. at 250 (“The Court can discern no substantive distinction in the application of the broad
national anti-discrimination policy, as embodied in the FHA, between zoning policies and real property
assessment policies effecting the fair provision of housing.”).
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value.85 Now, Coleman stands for the proposition that the FHA does, in fact,
apply to property tax administration.
More recently, in 2016, a New York trial court revisited the question of
whether the FHA applies to property tax administration.86 In Robinson v. City
of New York, plaintiffs alleged that New York City’s property tax
classification system violated the FHA because it disparately impacted
African-American and Hispanic residents.87 The city divided its real property
into four classifications. African-Americans and Hispanics were twice as
likely to reside in Class 2 (all other residential properties), while whites
primarily resided in Class 1 properties (one- to three- family homes).88
Although Class 1 properties had market values twice that of Class 2
properties, Class 1 properties paid 15.5% of the city’s real property tax, while
Class 2 paid 37%.89 Most importantly, plaintiffs claimed that apartment
owners in Class 2 passed this mark-up along to their tenants, and so the city’s
facially neutral property tax scheme had a racially discriminatory effect.90
The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that plaintiffs had no standing
because—even though they claimed that landlords pass the elevated taxes
along to tenants—plaintiffs presented no evidence to support this claim,
rendering their injury conjectural.91 Also, the court reasoned that plaintiffs
presented no evidence that the property tax classification system had a
disparate impact on African-Americans and Hispanics.92 Since the lack of
evidence and standing dominated the court’s decision in Robinson, it never
85

See O’Shea v. Bd. of Assessors of Nassau Cty., 864 N.E.2d 1261, 1264–65 (N.Y. 2007) (noting
the Coleman consent decree caps home value assessment increases at a maximum of 6% in any one year
or 20% over a five-year period).
86
See Robinson v. City of New York, No. 151679/2014, 2015 WL 3367799, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 20, 2015), aff’d 40 N.Y.S.3d 381, 383 (App. Div. 2016).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at *1–2.
91
Robinson, 40 N.Y.S.3d at 383. (“Moreover, plaintiffs are not property owners and thus, they do
not directly bear the costs of the property tax burden placed on larger buildings. The argument that
plaintiffs nonetheless have standing, as they have been injured by the tax scheme, resulting in higher rents
which would be reduced were real property taxes to be shared equitably among the different classes of
real property, is speculative. At this juncture, plaintiffs’ allegations as to injury are nothing more than
conjectural.”).
92
Id. at 383–84 (“Plaintiffs failed to identify where they live, other than being in apartment buildings
in the Bronx and Queens; how much rent they pay; and, what portion, if any, of their rent is attributable
to their landlord’s property tax obligation. Additionally, plaintiffs failed to allege that they in fact paid a
higher rent rate than they would have had their landlords received a more favorable property tax rate . . . .
Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim, which alleges a violation of federal Equal Protection Clause (US CONST.,
amend. XIV, § 1), and their corresponding state law claim (N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 11) fail in the absence
of proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose.” (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977); Esler v. Walters, 437 N.E.2d 1090, 1094 (N.Y. 1982))).
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reached the question of whether the FHA applies to property tax
administration when there is, in fact, sufficient evidence and standing.
The FHA’s applicability to property tax administration was also
addressed in the case of Drayton v. McIntosh County, filed in 2016.93
Plaintiffs (joined by the U.S. Attorney General and the District Attorney for
the Southern District of Georgia) alleged that state defendants—McIntosh
County and the State of Georgia—discriminated against the Gullah Geechee
population on Sapelo Island through the unequal and racially discriminatory
provision of housing and housing-related services.94 One of the plaintiffs’
claims was that, due to discriminatory appraisals, many plaintiffs witnessed
unprecedented increases in the assessed value of their homes.95 For instance,
the assessed value of Benjamin Hall’s home skyrocketed by 3,059% in one
year, increasing from $10,500 in 2011 to $331,650 in 2012.96 Plaintiffs
alleged that because of these discriminatory appraisals and the soaring
property tax bills that resulted, several people are at risk of losing their homes
to property tax foreclosure or being forced to preemptively sell their land.97
The court has yet to make a final ruling in Drayton.
As mentioned in the introduction of this Essay, there is also the case of
Morningside Community v. Sabree, where plaintiffs sued the City of Detroit
and Wayne County, alleging that inequitable property tax assessments
violate the Fair Housing Act.98 Beyond Coleman, Robinson, Drayton, and
Morningside, I am not aware of any other cases that apply the FHA to
property tax assessments, making this fairly uncharted terrain. Since the
Supreme Court has stated that the FHA’s language is “broad and inclusive,”99
there is a strong case that it does apply to property tax administration.

93
Complaint for Damages and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Drayton v. McIntosh Cty., No.
2:16-CV-00053, 2016 WL 3443919 (S.D. Ga. June 17, 2016).
94
See id. at ¶ 27. Plaintiffs contend that post-acquisition claims are cognizable under the FHA, as
supported by HUD’s implementing regulations. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4) (2017) (“Limiting the use
of privileges, services or facilities associated with a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin of an owner, tenant or a person associated with him or her.”);
24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (“Refusing to provide municipal services or property or hazard insurance for
dwellings or providing such services or insurance differently because of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin.”).
95
See Complaint for Damages and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 94, at ¶¶ 305–07.
96
Id. ¶ 307.
97
See id. ¶ 321.
98
Complaint, supra note 6, at ¶ 1.
99
See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (cited by Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1011 (7th Cir. 1979)) (“The language of the Fair
Housing Act is ‘broad and inclusive’”); see also Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2004
WL 2026804, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2004) (noting that the language of § 3604 regarding making
housing unavailable should be interpreted as broadly as possible).
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Coleman is the only case to directly rule on the matter, and that court decided
that the FHA does indeed apply.
2. Does the FHA Protect Housing Post-Acquisition?
Property tax assessments and foreclosure occur after the homeowner
has acquired the home. So if the FHA does not apply to housing postacquisition, then inequitable property tax administration would not fall under
the FHA’s penumbra. Some cases have held that the FHA protects plaintiffs
even after they have acquired their housing, but other cases have ruled it does
not.100
In 1984, the Seventh Circuit decided Southend Neighborhood
Improvement Ass’n v. County of St. Clair, which involved the discriminatory
provision of municipal services.101 The court found that, for municipal
services to fall under § 3604(a), they must have a direct impact on plaintiffs’
ability as potential homebuyers or renters to locate in a particular area or on
their ability to secure housing.102 Several lower courts followed the Seventh
Circuit holding in Southend, rejecting § 3604(a) claims involving the
discriminatory provision of municipal services if it did not adversely affect
access.103 For example, in Clifton Terrace Associates, Ltd. v. United
Technicians Corp., the court relied on Southend to reject a § 3604(a) claim,
alleging discrimination by an elevator repair company that refused to repair
an elevator for an apartment building because of the race of the residents.104
The court stated that this was an issue of a service resulting in inhabitability
of housing, but not the unavailability of housing as required under
§ 3604(a).105

100

See generally ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 14:3,
at 14-21 to 14-25 & nn.32–42 (2017) (discussing many cases and the different legal theories used under
§ 3604); infra note 121 and accompanying text.
101
743 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1984).
102
Id. at 1210 (first appellate case focused on FHA coverage of discrimination in municipal services,
where the court found § 3604(a) did not apply to failure to maintain properties because impact on property
value is not equivalent to making housing unavailable).
103
See, e.g., Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 192 (4th Cir. 1999)
(holding that highway-siting decision is not housing-related and noting that “[c]ountless private and
official decisions may affect housing in some remote and indirect manner, but the Fair Housing Act
requires a closer causal link between housing and the disputed action”); Lopez, 2004 WL 2026804, at *3
(applying Southend to reject § 3604(a) claim that industrial zoning, industrial pollution, and lack of flood
protection rendered property unavailable); Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass’n, 276 F. Supp. 2d
1222, 1229–31 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (noting that courts have interpreted § 3604(a) claims to apply to
government actions that impact the availability of housing for minorities), vacated, No. 8:02-CV1955T30TGW, 2003 WL 22149660, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2003) (settlement).
104
929 F.2d 714, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
105
Id.
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In Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, the
Seventh Circuit also used this inhabitability versus unavailability dichotomy
and argued that plaintiffs’ claim failed because they “are complaining not
about being prevented from acquiring property but about being harassed by
other property owners.”106 Although several courts have adopted the
dichotomy found in Halprin,107 in Bloch v. Frischholz, the Seventh Circuit
sitting en banc changed its position:
We highlight the word “after” because based on a prior opinion from this court,
Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327
(7th Cir. 2004), the district court concluded that condo owners couldn’t rely on
the FHA to safeguard their rights from any post-acquisition discrimination. We
took this case to the full court to consider this important question. Upon careful
review of the FHA and our prior opinion in Halprin, we conclude that in some
circumstances homeowners have an FHA cause of action for discrimination that
occurred after they moved in.108

Halprin has been cited by several courts,109 but they often discount the
portion of the Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision that declares the FHA can
106

388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004).
See, e.g., Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 2005); Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at
192 (4th Cir. 1999); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1536–38, 1542 (11th Cir. 1994); Clifton
Terrace Assocs. v. United Techs. Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Woods–Drake v. Lundy,
667 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir. 1982); King v. Metcalf 56 Homes Ass’n, No. 04-2192-JWL, 2004 WL
2538379, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 2004) (“The plain language of the statute . . . limits the scope of § 3604(b)
to discrimination in connection with the sale or rental of housing. . . . [D]istrict courts have widely held
that § 3604(b) extends only to discrimination that impacts the accessibility and availability of housing,
not to claims of discriminatory conduct relating to the use and enjoyment of previously acquired housing.”
(citation omitted)); Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood Ass’n, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1141–43 (S.D.
Fla. 2004) (stating that § 3604(b) is limited to actions related to the acquisition or sale and rental of
housing); Walton v. Claybridge Homeowners Ass’n., No. 1:03-CV-69-LJM-WTL, 2004 WL 192106, at
*4 (S.D. Ind. 2004); Gourlay, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1233 (“The context of the use of the phrase ‘in
connection therewith’ clearly limits claims for discriminatory provision of services to the provision of
those services in connection with a sale, because the preceding sentence mentions only the sale or rental
of a dwelling.”), vacated, 2003 WL 22149660, at *1 (settlement); Miller v. City of Dallas, No. 3:98–CV–
2955–D, 2002 WL 230834, at *12–13 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (granting summary judgment on Section
3604(a) claim for similar reasons); Hall v. Lowder Realty Co., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1319–20 (M.D.
Ala. 2001) (granting summary judgment against FHA plaintiff because that plaintiff had not shown that
the alleged discriminatory conduct affected the availability of housing); United States v. Weisz, 914 F.
Supp. 1050, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Laramore v. Ill. Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D.
Ill. 1989) .
108
587 F.3d 771, 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Prohibiting discrimination at the point of sale or rental
but not at the moment of eviction would only go halfway toward ensuring availability of housing. A
landlord would be required to rent to an African–American but then, the day after he moves in, could
change all the locks and put up signs that said, ‘No blacks allowed.’ That clearly could not be what
Congress had in mind when it sought to create ‘truly integrated and balanced living patterns.’”).
109
See, e.g., Hidden Vill., LLC v. City of Lakewood, 734 F.3d 519, 529 (6th Cir. 2013); Comm.
Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 712–13 (9th Cir. 2009); AHF Cmty.
Dev., LLC v. City of Dallas, 633 F. Supp. 2d 287, 298–99 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
107
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“reach post-acquisition discriminatory conduct that makes a dwelling
unavailable to the owner or tenant, somewhat like a constructive eviction.”110
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that other courts have
construed post-sale practices—such as redlining, racial steering,
exclusionary zoning, and other actions—as denying housing in violation of
3404(a).111
The Eighth Circuit also questioned the reasoning in Halprin, holding
instead that the FHA applies to housing post-acquisition—further
discrediting the inhabitability versus unavailability dichotomy.112 In addition,
the Eleventh Circuit has consistently applied the FHA to acts of housing
discrimination that occur after the acquisition of housing,113 as have several
other courts.114 Moreover, courts have consistently ruled that there is a

110

Bloch, 587 F.3d at 776; see also Halprin, 388 F.3d at 328–29.
Id. at 777 (quoting Southend Neighborhood, Improvement Ass’n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d
1207, 1209 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1984)).
112
Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2003).
113
See, e.g., Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1222–24 (11th Cir. 2016) (permitting claim
by current tenants based on landlord’s threatening conduct); Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo.
Ass’n, 765 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2014) (allowing current owner to bring a § 3604(f) claim against
condominium association); Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849 (11th Cir. 2010) (authorizing current
tenant to bring a FHA claim under § 3604(b)); Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase 1 Condo. Ass’n, 347 F.
App’x 464 (11th Cir. 2009) (permitting current owner to bring a § 3604(f) claim); Massaro v. Mainlands
Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass’n, 3 F.3d 1472 (11th Cir. 1993) (allowing current resident to bring a § 3604(a)
claim based on discriminatory interference with the continuing use and enjoyment of their dwelling).
114
See, e.g., Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 713 (9th
Cir. 2009) (“There are few ‘services or facilities’ provided at the moment of sale, but there are many
‘services or facilities’ provided to the dwelling associated with the occupancy of the dwelling. Under this
natural reading, the reach of the statute encompasses claims regarding services or facilities perceived to
be wanting after the owner or tenant has acquired possession of the dwelling.”); Evans v. Tubbe, 657 F.2d
661, 662–63, 663 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981) (enabling a homeowner to bring a claim against his neighbors under
§ 3604(a)); Schwarz v. Vills. Charter Sch., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1187–88 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (postacquisition claim based on § 3604(f)); McHale v. Water’s Edge Ass’n, No. 1:14-cv-23381-UU, 2014 WL
7883602, at *3–4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2014) (post-acquisition claim based on § 3604(f)); Smith v. Zacco,
No. 5:10-cv-360-TJC-JRK, 2011 WL 12450317, at *6–7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2011) (upholding a postacquisition claim against developer and homeowners’ association under §§ 3604(a) and (b)); Greater New
Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 723 F. Supp. 2d 14, 21–23 (D.D.C.
2010) (allowing current homeowners to make a claim under § 3604(a) for disparities in the distribution
of post-hurricane recovery funds); Savanna Club Worship Serv., Inc. v. Savanna Club Homeowners’
Ass’n, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1230 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (“Accordingly, part and parcel of the purchase of a
home within a planned community are the rights and privileges associated with membership within the
community. It would appear, therefore, that in the context of planned communities, where association
members have rights to use designated common areas as an incident of their ownership, discriminatory
conduct which deprives them of exercising those rights would be actionable under the FHA.”); Richards
v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484-OC-10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005) (indicating
Eleventh Circuit district courts have found that § 3604(b) claims apply to post-acquisition conduct for
renters); U.S. v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (D. Neb. 2004) (rejecting Halprin); Landesman v. Keys
Condo. Owners Ass’n, No. C 04-2685 PJH, 2004 WL 2370638, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2004) (allowing
111

1523

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

violation of § 3617 of the FHA—which prohibits coercion, intimidation,
threats, or interference with an individual’s exercise of rights protected under
the FHA—when sexual harassment causes a hostile environment after
residents acquire their housing.115 Most importantly, since HUD’s 1989
regulations require deference, 116 FHA protections extend to issues arising
after a residence’s acquisition because HUD’s regulations require this.117
Localities provide privileges, services, and facilities post-acquisition and
HUD’s regulations prohibit “[l]imiting the use of privileges, services or
facilities associated with a dwelling” to any protected class.118
The evidence suggesting that the FHA applies post-acquisition is
overwhelming. The classic slippery slope argument explains why many
jurists are nevertheless reluctant to apply the FHA to issues beyond the initial
sale or rental of housing. According to the Fifth Circuit in Cox v. City of
Dallas, “[a]lthough the FHA is meant to have a broad reach, unmooring the
‘services’ language from the ‘sale or rental’ language pushes the FHA into a
general anti-discrimination pose, creating rights for any discriminatory act
which impacts property values.”119 But, the FHA ensures that all
Americans—irrespective of their racial, gender, religious, or ethnic
identities—have fair access to housing, so this slippery slope argument
should not prevent its protections from extending post-acquisition.

families with children to challenge condominium association facilities’ rules as unlawfully discriminatory
under the FHA).
115
See, e.g., Richards, 2005 WL 1065141, at *3–4 (FHA applies to post-acquisition sexual
harassment); Williams v. Poretsky Mgmt., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 494–95 (D. Md. 1996) (sexual
harassment falls into FHA prohibition of sexual discrimination). But see DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d
1004, 1008–09 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that in this case, one instance of unwanted contact did not rise to
level of objectively hostile housing environment); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088–90 (10th Cir. 1993)
(holding that poor treatment of residents not solely directed at women was not actionable).
116
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (“The power of an administrative
agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy
and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress . . . Sometimes the
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case,
a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))).
117
24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2017) (“Conduct made unlawful under [section 3617] includes . . .
[t]hreatening, intimidating or interfering with persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling because of the
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin of such persons . . . .”) (emphasis
added); id. § 100.65(b)(2) (“Failing or delaying maintenance or repairs of sale or rental dwellings because
of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”).
118
Id. § 100.65(b)(4).
119
430 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 2005).
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3. Which Municipal Services Are Covered by the FHA?
Cities and towns provide municipal services post-acquisition. The FHA
prohibits discrimination in the provision of services related to a dwelling,
and courts have read this to include services traditionally provided by
municipalities.120 A key question for the present inquiry is whether property
tax administration is one of these “services” covered by the FHA. Neither
the text of the FHA nor HUD’s regulations provide details about exactly
which municipal services are covered under Section 3604, but a review of
case law shines light on this important question.121 In order to fall under the
FHA’s umbrella, property tax administration must be a municipal service
that affects an individual’s ability to acquire and maintain housing.
In his treatise, Housing Discrimination: Law & Litigation, Robert
Schwemm provides a comprehensive listing of all the cases where courts
have ruled that the discriminatory provision of municipal services is
actionable under § 3604(b) and when it is not.122 The relevant case law
suggests that the municipal services included are garbage collection, fire
protection, police protection, street paving, street lighting, sanitary sewers,
surface water drainage, water mains, fire hydrants, and traffic controls
signs.123
120

24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2017) (“Prohibited actions relating to dwellings under paragraph (b) of
this section include, but are not limited to: . . . Refusing to provide municipal services or property or
hazard insurance for dwellings or providing such services or insurance differently because of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”). See generally Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition
Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occupants Under the Fair Housing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.–C.L.L.
REV. 1, 9 (2008) (“In decisions dating back to 1974, courts have addressed the issue of whether § 3604(b)
should apply to a situation in which, for example, a county or municipality provides inferior water, trash,
or snow-clearing services to the majority-minority areas of town.”); Robert G. Schwemm, Cox, Halprin,
and Discriminatory Municipal Services Under the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717, 742 (2008)
(“Although the Seventh Circuit ruled against the particular § 3604(b) claim there, the court’s dicta that
this provision ‘applies to services generally provided by governmental units such as police and fire
protection or garbage collection’ became the foundation for numerous subsequent decisions that
recognized § 3604(b) as covering discriminatory municipal services.” (citing Southend Neighborhood
Improvement Ass’n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984))).
121
In his article about discriminatory municipal services under the FHA, Professor Schwemm has
carefully unearthed all the relevant cases. Schwemm, supra note 120, at 742; see also SCHWEMM, supra
note 100 § 14:3, at 14-21 to 14-25 & nn.32–42 .
122
See SCHWEMM, supra note 100, at § 14:1 to §14:3.
123
Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 983–84 (11th Cir. 1986) (inferior street paving and related
services and storm water drainage facilities to black neighborhoods); Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F.
Supp. 571, 573, 590 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (inferior street paving and related services to black neighborhoods);
Bryant v. City of Marianna, 532 F. Supp. 133, 135 (N.D. Fla. 1982) (discrimination in providing inferior
street paving and maintenance, water and sewer services, drainage facilities, fire protection, parks and
recreation facilities, and street lighting to black neighborhoods); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp.
1363, 1376–79 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (inferior street paving, parks and recreation facilities, and water service
to black neighborhoods); Selmont Improvement Ass’n v. Dallas Cty. Comm’n, 339 F. Supp. 477, 481
(S.D. Ala. 1972) (discrimination in providing inferior street paving to black neighborhoods); see also
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The case law, however, is not consistent. In Southend Neighborhood
Improvement v. County of St. Clair, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the
County’s poor maintenance of tax delinquent properties was not a municipal
service subject to the FHA.124 In this 1984 opinion, however, the dicta states
that § 3604(b) of the FHA applies to “services generally provided by
governmental units such as police and fire protection or garbage
collection.”125 But, more recently, in 2013, a district court denied New York
City’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s FHA claim, which
alleged that there was discriminatory provision of police services in New
York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) buildings.126
When the case law about which municipal services are covered by the
FHA is unclear, HUD’s regulations can shed light and clarify. For example,
in 1984, the plaintiffs in Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Cos. sought relief
because insurance companies did not extend homeowners insurance to
residents based on their race, or the race of the majority of homeowners in
the area—a phenomenon otherwise known as insurance redlining.127 In the
dicta of Mackey, the Fourth Circuit made clear that the prohibition of
discriminatory housing services “encompasses such things as garbage
collection and other services of the kind usually provided by
municipalities.”128 The court, however, ruled that the FHA did not outlaw
discrimination in homeowner’s insurance because it does not qualify as the
provision of services connected with dwellings under § 3604(a).129 In 1992,
the Seventh Circuit contradicted Mackey in NAACP v. American Family
Mutual Insurance Co., when it held that the FHA does apply to insurance

Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2005) (“By its express terms,
[§ 3604] applies to ‘the provision of services or facilities’ to a dwelling, such as a sewer service.”); Good
Shepherd Manor Found., Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 565 (7th Cir. 2003) (discriminatory
denial of water); Campbell v. Bowlin, 724 F.2d 484, 489–90 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (denial of water
and sewer facilities to plaintiff’s land in a predominantly black neighborhood based on intentional
discrimination); Kennedy Park Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970)
(ruling that a predominately white city’s refusal to connect a minority housing project to the existing
sewer system was a violation of the FHA); Davis v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324, 367–68
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discriminatory provision of police services); Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 495–97 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (discriminatory denial of sewer services).
124
743 F.2d 1207 (1984).
125
Id. at 1210.
126
Davis, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 367–68; Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405, 435–37
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). But see Vercher v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 454 F. Supp. 423, 424 (M.D. Pa. 1978)
(holding that § 3604(b) did not extend to police protection).
127
724 F.2d 419, 420 (4th Cir. 1984).
128
Id. at 424.
129
Id. at 424–25 (arguing discrimination in homeowner’s insurance does not qualify as making
housing unavailable under § 3604(a) and does not qualify as the provision of services in connection with
a dwelling under § 3604(b)).
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redlining.130 The court reasoned that § 3604 is written in general terms and
does not apply to certain people or industries; therefore, there is no basis to
imply an exemption for insurance providers.131 In 2000, HUD’s regulations
explicitly outlawed discrimination in the provision of “property or hazard
insurance for dwellings,” providing the definitive last word on the matter.132
From the existing case law, it is unclear whether the FHA covers
property tax administration. Since the FHA is a civil rights act dealing
specifically with the fair acquisition and maintenance of housing, it is crucial
that the municipal services covered directly impact these goals. Property
taxes discriminatorily applied can prevent protected groups from accessing
housing, or it can lead individuals and families unable to afford unfairly
assessed property taxes to forfeit their homes, as witnessed in Detroit. Since
property tax administration is a municipal service that affects an individual’s
ability to acquire and maintain housing, there is a strong argument that it falls
under the FHA’s umbrella. In addition, historically, property taxes were
commonly used to unjustly dispossess African-Americans of their
property,133 so there is also a strong argument that the FHA covers property
tax administration because it was designed to counteract historical patterns
of racial discrimination in housing.134 HUD can and should provide clarity.
B. FHA’s Disparate Impact Analysis
Once the court determines that the FHA applies to property tax
administration, then the next step is to examine whether Wayne County has
a policy or practice that causes unconstitutional tax assessments and tax
foreclosure to disparately impact African-Americans. In Texas Department
of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., the
Supreme Court validated HUD’s interpretation of the requirements for
proving a disparate impact claim under the FHA.135 According to HUD’s
regulations, “[a] practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually or
130

978 F.2d 287, 297–300 (7th Cir. 1992).
See id. at 299–300.
132
24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2000).
133
See Andrew W. Kahrl, Capitalizing on the Urban Fiscal Crisis: Predatory Tax Buyers in 1970s
Chicago, 2015 J. URBAN HIST. 1, 1 (2015); Andrew W. Kahrl, The Power to Destroy: Discriminatory
Property Assessments and the Struggle for Tax Justice in Mississippi, 82 J. S. HIST. 579, 582 (2016).
134
42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012) (“It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
442–43 (1968) (“[W]hen racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy
property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.”).
135
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015); Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation After Inclusive
Communities: What’s New and What’s Not, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 106, 107 (2015) (arguing that
the Supreme Court’s standards for FHA impact cases are similar to those set forth in the HUD regulation
but not identical).
131
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predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates,
increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”136 To
prove that there has been a disparate impact in violation of the FHA, I first
identify Wayne County’s equalization policy as the neutral policy causing
the statistical disparity. Then, I use the three-part burden-shifting framework
to show that Wayne County’s equalization policy causes a disparate impact
in violation of the FHA.
1. A Neutral Policy Must Cause a Statistical Disparity
The Supreme Court stated the first step in an FHA claim is that plaintiffs
must isolate the policy that caused the disparity.137
[A] disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if the
plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity.
A robust causality requirement ensures that “[r]acial imbalance . . . does not,
without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact” and thus protects
defendants from being held liable for racial disparities they did not create.138

The Court also noted that a one-time adverse decision does not
constitute a policy.139 Courts have ruled that policies in violation of the FHA
include: a zoning ordinance that disallowed apartments and required one acre
lot sizes, a policy that granted tax credits only in primarily African-American
neighborhoods, an ordinance prohibiting the rental or occupancy of a single
family dwelling to someone other than a blood relative if the occupant did
not first obtain a permissive use permit, and an ordinance placing a
temporary moratorium on construction of multi-family dwellings.140
In this case, the relevant policy is Wayne County’s equalization policy,
which disparately impacts the county’s predominately African-American
cities. While it is solely the local assessor’s responsibility to determine the

136
24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2017); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577–78 (2009)
(arguing that disparate impact doctrine prohibits facially neutral practices with discriminatory effects on
protected classes if the defendant cannot show a legitimate interest in pursuing the practice).
137
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
138
Id. (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989)).
139
Id.
140
See, e.g., id. at 2515–26 (state policy of granting tax credits in urban, primarily African-American
areas is evidence of disparate impact); Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Par.,
641 F. Supp. 2d 563, 577 (E.D. La. 2009) (finding St. Bernard Parish’s twelve-month moratorium on
construction of multi-family dwellings was a violation of the FHA); Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, 109 F.
Supp. 2d 526, 565–66 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (zoning ordinance that prohibited apartments and required oneacre lot sizes was racially discriminatory). For more information about the litigation in St. Bernard Parish,
see Editorial, Time Runs Out for St. Bernard Parish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/opinion/30wed3.html [https://perma.cc/E5SK-6BAZ].
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assessed value of each residential property,141 using its own sales or appraisal
studies, the county must review and verify assessed values to ensure no class
of property is unconstitutionally assessed.142 If there is inequity, then the
equalization department “shall” apply a county equalization factor to ensure
no class of property exceeds the constitutional limit: 50% of true cash
value.143 According to Section 211.34(2) of the Michigan General Property
Tax Act:
The county board of commissioners shall examine the assessment rolls of the
townships or cities and ascertain whether the real and personal property in the
respective townships or cities has been equally and uniformly assessed at true
cash value. If, on the examination, the county board of commissioners considers
the assessments to be relatively unequal, it shall equalize the assessments by
adding to or deducting from the valuation of the taxable property in a township
or city an amount which in the judgment of the county board of commissioners
will produce a sum which represents the true cash value of that property . . . .144

If one city assesses its residential properties at a different level than
another city in the county, then equalization is intended to rectify this
difference and achieve uniformity.145 In Wayne County, assessors in certain
local units were indeed assessing at a different level than assessors in other
units, but the equalization process did not fix this disparity. As discussed
below in Part IV, the data analysis conducted in this study demonstrates that
residential properties in Wayne County’s predominately African-American
cities were less likely to be assessed in line with the Michigan Constitution
than residential properties in its predominately white cities.146 The county
had three nonexclusive options for rectifying these disparities: 1) work with
the cities to ensure that the cumulative assessed values for all residential
properties did not exceed 50% of the cumulative market value, 2) apply a
factor that would categorically reduce the assessed values of all residential
141

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.10(1) (1994).
Fairplains Twp. v. Montcalm Cty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 542 N.W.2d 897, 899 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)
(“A sales-ratio study compares the sales prices of recent typical sales within a given property
classification with the prior year’s assessed values for those same parcels. An appraisal study is similar,
but is used in situations where there is an insufficient number of recent sales. Appraisal studies compare
actual appraisals of a sampling of properties to the previous year’s assessments.”).
143
See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3; MICHIGAN TAXPAYER’S GUIDE, supra note 5, at 1 (stating the
board of commissioners in every county can apply an equalization factor to assessed values to ensure that
property owners pay their fair share of taxes).
144
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.34(2) (2018) (emphasis added).
145
Fairplains Twp., 542 N.W.2d at 899 (stating that “[e]qualization is based on a theory that an
assessor will assess uniformly within the district but may assess at a level different from those of assessors
in other districts.”).
146
See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3. Through a FOIA request, the author has secured all of Wayne
County’s sales and appraisal studies from 2011–2016 (on file with author).
142
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properties, or 3) report the offending cities to the state tax commission,
which—under the authority of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.10f—can assume
jurisdiction of its assessment roll until the local unit is in compliance.
Under the first option, once a county identifies inequalities through its
own sales or appraisals studies, it can help the local unit to ensure the
assessment roles are equally and uniformly assessed. Section 211.23(a) of
Michigan’s General Property Tax Act allows the county to “employ an
independent appraisal firm” to help local assessors determine the market
value of properties and to equalize assessments.147 The county can also use
its authority under Section 211.34(3) of the General Property Tax Act to
assist local assessors with the “the development and maintenance of accurate
property descriptions, the discovery, listing, and valuation of properties for
tax purposes, and the development and use of uniform valuation standards
and techniques for the assessment of property.”148 The goal of providing this
assistance is to ensure that the cumulative assessed values for all residential
properties (or any other class of property) do not exceed 50% of the
cumulative market value for the category.
But, until Detroit’s Assessments Division completed a citywide reassessment in January 2017, this was a futile exercise for Detroit (Wayne
County’s largest city) because it did not have an accurate record of the
cumulative market value for all residential homes. To determine a property’s
market value, Michigan law requires assessors to estimate the land value and
add to that the value of improvements less depreciation, using the most
updated cost estimates found in the Michigan Residential Assessor’s
Manual.149 Due to the botched switch in 2002 from the Assessments

147

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.23(a).
Id. § 211.34(3).
149
In reality, the land value is not usually based on an actual sale price. See id. § 211.27(1). Instead,
it is a flat value determined by an individual based either on a variety of unstated factors or pure
conjecture. See id. There is nominal assurance that the property’s override value is equivalent to the
property’s market. See id. Consequently, in order for an equalization department to correctly ascertain
the total market value for any class of property, the assessors in the local units must follow the cost
estimates in the manual, and a significant number of properties should not be in override. See
id. § 211.10(e) (“All assessing officials, whose duty it is to assess real or personal property on which real
or personal property taxes are levied by any taxing unit of the state, shall use only the official assessor’s
manual or any manual approved by the state tax commission, consistent with the official assessor’s
manual, with their latest supplements, as prepared or approved by the state tax commission as a guide in
preparing assessments.”); see also APPRAISAL STANDARDS BD., UNIFORM STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE: 2018-2019 EDITION 40 (2018), https://nrpabappraiserce.ne.gov/appraiser/public/USPAP_current.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB6Z-UYNV] (supporting
documentation must be maintained and presented for mass appraisals, including “extraordinary
assumptions and hypothetical conditions,” indicating that properties in override must be accounted for).
See generally STATE OF MICH., MICHIGAN RESIDENTIAL ASSESSOR’S MANUAL (2003),
148
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Division’s legacy mainframe system to the new Equalizer system, the data
in the system was inaccurate,150 and this was no secret to the Wayne County
Equalization Department.
Since equalization is not possible if there is no accurate record of the
total market value for any category of real property, Wayne County could
only perform what I call “quasi-equalization” in jurisdictions with faulty
records. This quasi-equalization was particularly harmful to cities where
unconstitutional tax assessments were rampant, and thus a bona fide
equalization process was vital. Wayne County’s predominately AfricanAmerican cities are unconstitutionally assessed at significantly higher rates
than its predominantly white cities, so Wayne County’s failure to properly
monitor and equalize the assessments had a disparate impact on AfricanAmericans in violation of the FHA.
Under the second remediation option, once Wayne County discovered
inequities that it could not properly resolve, it should have applied a factor
to the entire class of residential properties. Counties in the State of Michigan
apply factors very infrequently.151 When they do apply them, the factor is
usually greater than one, meaning that the cumulative assessed value for the
class of property will increase. But, in this case, a factor less than one was
required because—since property values had declined so precipitously in
2008—an across-the-board decrease in assessed values for all residential
properties in taxing jurisdictions with a precipitous drop in housing values
was required. In other words, Wayne County’s facially neutral policy of
quasi-equalization was insufficient and disparately impacted AfricanAmerican cities, which experienced sharper declines in value and hence were
more likely to be over assessed in violation of the Michigan Constitution.
The purpose of equalization is to achieve uniformity among the various
taxing units in the county,152 so categorically cutting the assessed value for
all residential property in cities where unconstitutional tax assessments
became the norm would have helped them achieve uniformity with cities
where assessed values did not systematically violate the Michigan
Constitution.
Utilizing the third remediation option, Wayne County reported
Detroit’s Assessments Division to the State Tax Commission, which has the

https://www.michigan.gov/documents/Vol1-02GeneralInstructions-PricingExamples_120864_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8UL-9GKC].
150
See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 38, at 10.
151
Interview with Lori Parr, Field Operations Section Staff Member, Michigan State Tax
Commission, Property Services Division (October 4, 2017).
152
Conroy v. City of Battle Creek, 22 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Mich. 1946); O’Reilly v. Wayne Cty.,
323 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
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power to assume jurisdiction over the assessment role of a troubled local unit
until it can come back into compliance with the law.153 As discussed earlier
in this Essay, Detroit’s Auditor General examined the Assessments Division
and produced a report that laid bare the intense mismanagement that caused
systematic unconstitutional property tax assessments and rife tax
delinquency.154 In 2014, the state tax commission’s response was to assume
jurisdiction over Detroit’s Assessments Division and put a corrective action
plan in place.155 It was not until August of 2017 that Detroit was released
from the tax commission’s oversight because it completed a citywide reappraisal.156 After this, assessments were finally based on market values, as
required by law.
In sum, prior to the 2017 citywide re-appraisal, Wayne County should
have applied a factor in cities that were habitually overassessing its residents
or it should have helped these cities to perform a citywide reassessment, but
it did not. This discrete and facially neutral equalization policy unduly
burdened predominantly African-American cities. In the next Section, I go
through the FHA’s required three-prong burden-shifting framework, and
conclude that Wayne County’s equalization policy had a disparate impact on
African-Americans in violation of the FHA.
2.

Three-Part Burden Shifting Framework for Proving a Disparate
Impact Claim
Disparate impact analysis entails a three-part burden-shifting
framework outlined in Subpart G of HUD’s regulations and accepted by the
Supreme Court in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v.
Inclusive Communities Project.157 First, to establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact, the plaintiff must identify a facially neutral policy or
practice that has a discriminatory effect on one of the groups protected under
the FHA.158 A successful claim requires a comparative analysis that uses
153
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.152(3) (“Whenever a local assessing district fails to have an
assessment roll prepared as required in this act and it becomes necessary for the commission to assess the
properties in the district either by its own staff or the county equalization department under direction of
the commission, the local assessing district shall bear the cost of such assessment and shall reimburse the
state or county.”).
154
See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 38, at 2.
155
Christine Ferretti, supra note 52.
156
Id.
157
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2514–15 (2015); see also Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d
581, 617–19 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding an obligation to defer to HUD’s disparate impact framework);
24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c) (2017) (discussing the burden-shifting framework).
158
See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (“[A] plaintiff must begin by
identifying the specific . . . practice that is challenged.”); HDC, LLC. v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608,
613 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[P]laintiff must demonstrate that a facially neutral policy or practice has the effect
of discriminating against a protected class of which the plaintiff is a member.” (quoting Graoch Assocs.
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statistical evidence to show the policy adversely or disproportionately
impacts a protected group, but does not likewise impact a second control
group.159 The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the “challenged practice
caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.”160
Second, even if plaintiffs successfully establish a prima facie case, the
discriminatory policy may still be lawful if it is supported by a legally
sufficient justification.161 According to HUD’s regulations, this justification
exists when “the challenged practice . . . [i]s necessary to achieve one or
more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the
respondent . . . [and] [t]hose interests could not be served by another practice
that has a less discriminatory effect.”162 At this second stage, defendants have
the burden of proof and must provide evidence to demonstrate that their
justification is not merely speculative or hypothetical.163
Third, if defendants satisfy their burden of proving that there is a legally
sufficient justification, then plaintiffs can still prevail so long as they prove
that “the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the

# 33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 371 (6th
Cir.2007))); see also Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (“[A] disparate-impact claim that relies on a
statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that
disparity. A robust causality requirement ensures that ‘[r]acial imbalance . . . does not, without more,
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact’ and thus protects defendants from being held liable for
racial disparities they did not create.” (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653
(1989))); Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 617.
159
See Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 575 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A] successful
disparate impact claim involves a comparison between two groups—those affected and those unaffected
by the facially neutral policy.”); see also Graoch Assocs., 508 F.3d at 371–72 (noting that every housing
practice that has a disparate impact is not necessarily illegal therefore plaintiff must produce statistical
evidence to show the landlord’s action had a disparate impact); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937–38 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d in part , 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam) (stating
that statistical analysis supports disparate impact claims); Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., 50 F. Supp.
3d 300, 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Hargraves v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C.
2000)) (noting that Hargraves held that “allegations of predatory lending concentrated in minority census
tracts, supported by statistical evidence, adequately plead disparate impact without favorable loans
outside protected class.”).
160
24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2017).
161
See id. § 100.500(c)(3).
162
Id. § 100.500(b)(1)(i)–(ii).
163
See id. § 100.500(b)(2) (“A legally sufficient justification must be supported by evidence and
may not be hypothetical or speculative.”). See generally Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
419 F.3d 729, 742 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding there was nominal evidence to support Housing Authority’s
claim that the high crime rate justified discriminatory housing practices); Greater New Orleans Fair Hous.
Action Ctr. v. Saint Bernard Par., 641 F. Supp. 2d 563, 574–78 (E.D. La. 2009) (defendant did not present
enough evidence to show there were discriminatory housing policies that restricted development of
affordable housing in predominately white areas).
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challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less
discriminatory effect.”164
The three-part burden-shifting framework is required to investigate
whether Wayne County’s equalization practices violate the FHA. In the first
step, Wayne County’s equalization practices are facially neutral and
constitute a cognizable policy rather than a one-time decision.165 To prove
that this neutral policy disparately impacts African-Americans, plaintiffs can
offer statistical evidence.166 Indeed, Part IV of this Essay provides strong
empirical evidence that predominantly African-American cities in Wayne
County experience unconstitutional tax assessments and tax foreclosure at a
much greater rate than predominantly white cities. Due to unreliable property
valuations, Wayne County failed to properly equalize tax assessments and
this policy of quasi-equalization affected the cities that needed equalization
the most—those subjecting their residents to systemic unconstitutional
assessments.
Once plaintiffs submit evidence establishing that discriminatory
assessment and equalization practices exist, the analysis moves to the second
step: the defendant now has the burden of proving that the practices are
nonetheless lawful because they are supported by a legally sufficient
justification.167 Wayne County will likely argue that given the poor market
data available when a significant number of properties in a jurisdiction are
not calculated according to the state’s standard rules (i.e., they are in
override), quasi-equalization was the best it could do under these less than
ideal circumstances. Hence, the policy of quasi-equalization was not an
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barrier.168 Rather, quasi-equalization
was necessary to achieve a semblance of uniformity in light of information164
24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3) (“If the respondent or defendant satisfies the burden of proof set forth
in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the charging party or plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by
another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578
(2009) (noting that before rejecting a business justification—or a governmental entity’s analogous public
interest—a court must determine that a plaintiff has shown that there is “an available alternative . . .
practice that has less disparate impact and serves the [entity’s] legitimate needs”).
165
See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2523 (2015) (“For instance, a plaintiff challenging the decision of a private developer to construct a new
building in one location rather than another will not easily be able to show this is a policy causing a
disparate impact because such a one-time decision may not be a policy at all.”).
166
See Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Relations Comm’n,
508 F.3d 366, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
under the FHA a plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of the alleged adverse effect).
167
24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (2013).
168
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524 (“Governmental or private policies are not contrary to the
disparate-impact requirement unless they are ‘artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.’” (quoting
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971))).
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based resource constraints.169 Wayne County will be able to prove that this
justification is not merely speculative or hypothetical.170 Wayne County may
also argue that its policy of quasi-equalization would not have had a racially
disparate impact if taxpayers exercised their legal right to appeal when their
property tax assessments exceeded 50% of their property’s market value.
The burden-shifting analysis would then progress to the third and final
part, which is when plaintiffs provide evidence that the legitimate interests
underpinning the challenged practice could be served by another practice that
has a less discriminatory effect. In this case, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving that applying a factor less than one to all residential properties and
decreasing the assessed values for the entire class would have a less
discriminatory effect than the policy of quasi-equalization.
Plaintiffs would do well to allege that Wayne County’s own sales
studies showed year after year that certain local units were consistently
assessing their residents in violation of the Michigan Constitution.171 Without
accurate data, property equalization was impossible. So, the one thing that
Wayne County could have done was reduce assessed values for the entire
class of residential property in local units where unconstitutional
assessments were rampant. This would have promoted uniformity, made
property tax bills more affordable, and prevented many people from
forfeiting their homes through tax foreclosure.172 Even though Detroit’s
mayor openly admitted on several occasions that the city was over-assessing
Detroit residents and subjecting them to inflated property taxes, Wayne
County did not apply the factor.173 Applying a factor is not a perfect solution,
but it may have had a substantially less discriminatory effect than its policy
of quasi-equalization. Without the factor, between 2011 and 2015, about
30% of Detroit homes completed the tax foreclosure process. This was not
only deeply unjust, but also arguably a violation of the FHA. The next
Section provides the explicit statutory basis of the FHA violation.

169

See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(1)–(2) (2017).
See id. § 100.500(b)(2).
171
For records for 2014–2015, see Detroit Open Data, CITY OF DETROIT, https://data.detroitmi.gov
[https://perma.cc/2W3B-ALMZ] (search “Property and follow “Wayne County Tax Auction” results)
(data currently unavailable is on file with author). The city’s published file on their open data portal has
382,051 records. For additional information, see Parcel Map, supra note 9.
172
See Atuahene & Berry, supra note 23.
173
Christine Ferretti, Property Taxes Going Down for over Half of Detroiters, DETROIT NEWS
(published Jan. 23, 2017, 11:05 AM; updated Jan. 24, 2017, 9:31 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/
story/news/local/detroit-city/2017/01/23/detroit-property-assessments/96946512
[https://perma.cc/KW7G-4HLD].
170

1535

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

C. Analyzing Unconstitutional Tax Assessments Under §§ 3604 and 3605
of the FHA
To assess whether unconstitutional tax assessments and quasiequalization in Detroit and other predominantly African-American cities in
Wayne County violated the FHA, § 3604 and § 3605 of the Act are
determinative. Section 3604 addresses discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing and other prohibited practices, while § 3605 pertains to
discrimination in other residential real estate-related transactions.174 More
directly, § 3604(a) prohibits municipalities from providing services
differently such that persons are denied dwellings, § 3604(b) prohibits
discrimination that involves limiting access to municipal services related to
the sale or rental of a dwelling, and § 3605(a) prohibits discrimination based
on the availability or performance of appraisals.175
A violation of § 3604 and § 3605 can occur due to disparate treatment
or disparate impact.176 Disparate treatment requires plaintiffs to show that the
discriminatory act was not accidental or neutral, but rather intentional.177 In
contrast, a disparate impact analysis bypasses intent-based queries to focus
instead on the policy’s discriminatory effect.178 Although the disparate

174
See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, and
prohibiting discrimination against any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin); id. § 3605 (prohibiting discrimination in transactions related to residential real estate
because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin).
175
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
176
See 24 C.F.R. § 100.5 (2017) (“The illustrations of unlawful housing discrimination in this part
may be established by a practice’s discriminatory effect, even if not motivated by discriminatory intent,
consistent with the standards outlined in § 100.500.”); see also M & T Mortg. Corp. v. White, 736 F.
Supp. 2d 538, 574 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“FHA and ECOA claims may be prosecuted on the basis of (i)
disparate treatment, i.e., that plaintiffs were treated differently because of their membership in a protected
class, or on the basis of (ii) disparate impact, i.e., that the defendant’s practices have a proportionally
greater negative impact on minority populations.”); William F. Fuller, Note, What’s HUD Got to Do with
It?: How HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule May Save the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard,
83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2047, 2058 (2015) (discussing the difference between purposeful discrimination
and neutral acts with a discriminatory effect).
177
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
178
See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513
(2015) (noting that disparate impact analysis “challenges practices that have a ‘disproportionately adverse
effect on minorities’ and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale” (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano,
557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009))); see also Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577; 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (“Liability may be
established under the Fair Housing Act based on a practice’s discriminatory effect, as defined in
paragraph (a) of this section, even if the practice was not motivated by a discriminatory intent.”).
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treatment and impact doctrines apply to both sections,179 this Essay’s aim is
to provide evidence solely of disparate impact.180
Section II.C.1 below argues that Wayne County’s unconstitutional
property tax assessments and the associated foreclosures disparately impact
African-Americans in violation of FHA § 3604(a), which prohibits the denial
of a dwelling on account of race. Next, Section II.C.2 argues a violation of
FHA §§ 3604(b) and 3605(a) occurred because local assessors did not
annually appraise properties, and Wayne County failed to correct the results
of this misstep through the equalization process.
1. Dwelling Denied Under § 3604(a)
Since unconstitutional property tax assessments and property tax
foreclosures disparately impacted Wayne County’s predominately AfricanAmerican cities, Wayne County violated FHA § 3604(a), which states that
[I]t shall be unlawful . . . to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide
offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion,
sex, familial status, or national origin.181

Subpart B of HUD’s regulations provides a thicker description of what
constitutes unlawful housing discrimination under § 3604.182 According to
HUD, § 3604(a) makes it unlawful to “engage in any conduct relating to the
provision of housing or of services and facilities in connection therewith that
otherwise makes unavailable or denies dwellings to persons.”183 HUD has
stated that prohibited activities include, but are not limited to,
179
See generally Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (stating that disparate treatment was the
primary form of discrimination the act protected against, but HUD formally recognized disparate impact
liability, which was later codified under FHA § 3604(a) Discrimination in Sale or Rental of Housing and
Other Prohibited Practices and § 3605(a) Discrimination in Residential Real Estate-Related
Transactions).
180
Because § 3617 of the FHA—dealing with interference, coercion, or intimidation—requires
disparate treatment, it is not included in this analysis. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful
to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account
of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in
the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this
title.”); see also East-Miller v. Lake Cty. Highway Dep’t, 421 F.3d 558, 563–64 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o
prevail on a § 3617 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) [s]he is a protected individual under the FHA[],
(2) [s]he was engaged in the exercise or enjoyment of [her] fair housing rights . . . , (3) Defendants were
motivated in part by an intent to discriminate, or their conduct produced a disparate impact, and (4)
Defendants coerced, threatened, intimidated, or interfered with the Plaintiff on account of [her] protected
activity under the FHA[].” (alterations in original)).
181
See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
182
See 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.50–.90 (2017).
183
Id. § 100.70(b).
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discriminatorily providing municipal services or hazard insurance or failure
to provide these services at all to members of a protected category.184 Case
law shows that § 3604(a) reaches both governmental and private conduct
involving the denial or unavailability of housing.185
Through the equalization process, Wayne County is legally mandated
to ensure that each class of “real and personal property in the respective
townships or cities has been equally and uniformly assessed at true cash
value.”186 If the county finds there are inequalities, then it “must equalize to
produce a sum which represents the true cash value of the property.”187
Equalization is a municipal service related to housing, and Wayne County’s
failure to do it properly has adversely affected cities where unconstitutional
tax assessments are pervasive. This study finds that predominantly AfricanAmerican cities are subject to unconstitutional tax assessments and
foreclosure at a greater rate than predominantly white cities. In addition, in
a forthcoming paper that I coauthored with Professor Christopher Berry, we
estimate that 10% of all tax foreclosures were caused by illegally inflated tax
assessments.188 As a result, Wayne County has violated § 3604(a) because
residents of predominantly African-American cities are disproportionately
denied dwellings due to the county’s policy of quasi-equalization, which did
not correct unconstitutional tax assessments in the residential property
class.189

184
See id. § 100.70(d)(4) (“Refusing to provide municipal services or property or hazard insurance
for dwellings or providing such services or insurance differently because of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin.”).
185
See, e.g., Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2005)
(discrimination in charging sewer service rates); Good Shepherd Manor Found. Inc. v. City of Momence,
323 F.3d 557, 565 (7th Cir. 2003) (discriminatory denial of water); Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of
Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 799–800 (6th Cir. 1996) (discriminatory enforcement of zoning laws can make
housing unavailable in violation of the FHA); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of
Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1974) (denial of water and sewage services, as well as exposure
to pollutants); Davis v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324, 367–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discriminatory
provision of police services); Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 723 F. Supp. 2d 14, 21–23 (D.D.C. 2010) (applying § 3604(a) to disparities in the allocation of
post-hurricane recovery funds to current property owners); Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp.
2d 456, 463 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (discriminatory denial of sewer services).
186
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.34 (1986); see also MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 209.41(6) (2009).
187
Allied Supermarkets, Inc v. City of Detroit, 216 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Mich. 1974) (quoting MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 211.34).
188
See Atuahene & Berry, supra note 23.
189
See Morningside Cmty. Org. v. Wayne Cty. Treasurer, No. 336430, 2017 WL 4182985 (Mich.
Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2017) (per curiam) (discussing the Plaintiff’s assertions of disparate impact of Wayne
County’s foreclosure process on African-Americans), appeal denied 905 N.W.2d 597 (Mich. 2018). In
Morningside v. Sabree, plaintiffs challenged the foreclosures rather than the county’s failure to comply
with its equalization duty. See Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 6.
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2. Discriminatory Appraisals Under § 3604(b) and § 3605(a)
While both § 3604(a) and (b) of the FHA deal with the discriminatory
provision of services, the primary difference between them is that § 3604(a)
is concerned with plaintiffs who are denied dwellings, while § 3604(b)
focuses on the terms of the sale or rental, and the provision of housing related
services, but does not necessarily involve the denial of a dwelling.190 This
Section argues that a violation of § 3604(b) and § 3605(a) of the FHA
occurred because local assessors have failed to annually appraise properties,
and Wayne County has failed to use the equalization process to correct the
results of this misstep for the residential property class.
As discussed above, the Michigan Constitution clearly states that a
property’s assessed value is not to exceed 50% of the property’s market
value.191 Each Assessments Division in Michigan is advised to assess
properties annually and “inspect 20% of properties in their local unit
annually.”192 The primary cause of unconstitutional tax assessments in
Wayne County is the local Assessments Division’s failure to properly
appraise properties annually, as required by law.193 For properties that have
dropped significantly in value over the years, updated appraisals are even
more essential.194
Section 3604(b) states that it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,
or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because
of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”195 HUD has
interpreted this provision to mean that it is unlawful “to impose different
terms, conditions or privileges relating to the sale or rental of a dwelling or
to deny or limit services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental of
a dwelling.”196
190
See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (“[I]t shall be unlawful—(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making
of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. (b)
To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,
or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin.”).
191
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27(a)(1).
192
MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMM’N, supra note 48, at 1 (“As a guideline, the State Tax Commission
recommends that assessors inspect 20% of properties in their local unit annually.”); see MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 211.10 (1994).
193
See Atuahene & Hodge, supra note 7.
194
See id. at 27 (“Detroit’s assessors are illegally assessing lower-valued properties by a substantial
margin, while the assessment ratios for higher-valued property are at or even below the constitutionally
permitted limit of 0.5.”).
195
42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
196
24 C.F.R. § 100.65(a) (2017); see also id. § 100.65(b)(4).
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Critics would argue that the appraisals at issue are not performed in
connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling. But, to determine whether a
home is affordable, homeowners must know their property tax liability prior
to initial purchase and occupancy. So, the appraisal behind the property tax
calculation is directly connected to home sales. Additionally, appraisals are
indeed a service provided in connection with the sale of a dwelling because
both Wayne County and its assessment divisions appraise properties by
analyzing recent sales of comparable properties.197 Wayne County violated
§ 3604(b) if its own sales studies or appraisals showed unconstitutional
assessments were rife in predominately African-American cities, but it failed
to use the equalization process to correct this for the residential property
class.
In addition, § 3605(a)—discussing discrimination in residential real
estate-related transactions beyond sale or rental—states that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes
engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against
any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions
of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin.198

The term “residential real estate-related transaction” includes “selling,
brokering, or appraising” residential real estate.199 HUD’s authoritative
interpretation of § 3605(a) states that it is unlawful for agencies to
discriminate either in making appraisals available or in the performance of
appraisal services.200 HUD defines “appraisal” as an “estimate or opinion of
the value of a specified residential real property made in a business context
in connection with the sale, rental, financing or refinancing of a dwelling or
in connection with any activity that otherwise affects the availability of a
residential real estate-related transaction.”201 Given the centrality of appraisal
services to the property tax assessment and equalization processes, the
question for a § 3605(a) analysis becomes whether Wayne County’s
equalization department is an “entity whose business includes engaging in
residential real estate-related transactions.”202
In prior cases, this classification has entailed both quasi-public and
private agencies, including mortgage lenders, insurance providers, bankers,
197
See, e.g., Antisdale v. City of Galesburg, 362 N.W.2d 632, 636–37 (Mich. 1984); INT’L ASS’N OF
ASSESSING OFFICERS, supra note 3, at 9.
198
42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).
199
Id. § 3605(b).
200
24 C.F.R.§ 100.135(a). See generally SCHWEMM, supra note 100, § 18.7–.8, at 18-32 to 18-39.
201
24 C.F.R.§ § 100.135(b).
202
42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).
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and a quasi-public agency empowered to issue tax-exempt bonds.203 In Eva
v. Midwest National Mortgage Bank, Inc., a federal district court decided a
business that charged a fee for servicing a home loan qualified as an entity
whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related
transactions, even though the entity was not directly involved in “the selling,
brokering, or appraising of residential real property.”204 If a business
indirectly involved in providing home loans qualifies, then surely a public
entity that is directly involved in appraising properties will also qualify.
Although I am aware of no case that examines specifically whether a county
equalization department or a city’s assessment division qualifies as an entity
whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related
transactions, the connection is clear.
In sum, there is a violation of § 3605(a) and § 3604(b) because AfricanAmericans are disparately impacted by the failure of certain assessment
divisions to provide proper appraisal services as required by law, and the
failure of Wayne County to correct this through the equalization process.
D. Litigating Unconstitutional Property Tax Assessments Under the FHA
Lawyers must decide which court to litigate a FHA violation based
upon discriminatory property tax administration. Due to the Tax Injunction
Act, plaintiffs cannot litigate an FHA claim in federal courts because they
are not allowed to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or
collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”205 For instance, in United
States v. County of Nassau, the court granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss because the Act prohibited the United States from challenging the
county’s discriminatory residential property tax assessment scheme under
the FHA.206 While it is clear that the Tax Injunction Act requires that
203

See Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Accredited Home Lenders Holding Co., 573 F. Supp. 2d
70 (D.D.C. 2008) (memorandum); Nevels v. W. World Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (W.D. Wash.
2004); Nat’l Fair Hous. All., Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2002); Eva
v. Midwest Nat’l Mortg. Banc, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 862, 889 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (“The plain language of
the statute does not, as Defendant USMR contends, require a defendant to be a mortgage lender, banker,
mortgage arranger or creditor. (Doc. # 38 at 12) To the contrary, the plain language of § 3605 merely
requires that the entity conduct business which ‘includes engaging in residential real estate-related
transactions.’ 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (emphasis added). Thus, the entity need not be specifically existing for
the purpose of engaging in real estate-related transactions; such activity need only be ‘included’ as one
portion of its overall functioning.”); United States v. Mass. Indus. Fin. Agency, 910 F. Supp. 21 (D. Mass.
1996); see also SCHWEMM, supra note 100, § 18:1, at 18-3 n.9 and accompanying text.
204
See 143 F. Supp. 2d at 881, 89–90 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b)).
205
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
206
79 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Therefore, the Court concludes that the instant action
is not subject to any of the exceptions to the Tax Injunction Act.”).
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plaintiffs litigate these types of FHA claims in state court, the question in the
litigation against Detroit and Wayne County is which Michigan court: the
Michigan Tax Tribunal or Michigan trial court?
In Morningside, the plaintiffs made a claim against the City of Detroit
for administering the poverty tax exemption without due process, but the trial
court dismissed the FHA claim against Wayne County, stating that the claim
should have been brought to the Michigan Tax Tribunal. Plaintiffs argued
that the Tax Tribunal was not a court and the FHA states that “[a]n aggrieved
person may commence a civil action in an appropriate United States district
court or State court.”207 Even though the Tax Tribunal is not a court, the
Michigan Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed the judgment of the trial
court.208 Now that the Morningside plaintiffs’ appeal to the Michigan
Supreme Court has failed, they can refile their case in the Tax Tribunal. This,
however, presents three important limitations.
First, the Michigan courts have long recognized that “the rules of the
Tax Tribunal do not provide for class actions.”209 While a class action affords
an opportunity to address the structural shortcomings of the assessment and
equalization processes, the Tax Tribunal only provides relief to individuals.
Second, the FHA expressly provides that aggrieved persons have one year to
file a claim with HUD.210 But, under the Tax Tribunal’s procedures, a
homeowner has just a few weeks to file a claim during the Assessor’s Review
and then the March Board of Review, which are prerequisites to the Tribunal
acquiring jurisdiction.211 Third, in Wikman v. City of Novi, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that “the Tax Tribunal lacks the power to issue an
injunction” because this is an exercise of judicial power, which the
legislature cannot transfer to an administrative agency.212 But, the FHA
authorizes private persons to commence a civil action, and if the court finds
that discriminatory housing practices have occurred, then the potential
remedies include actual and punitive damages, a permanent or temporary
injunction, a temporary restraining order, an order of affirmative action, and
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.213 So, although the FHA permits
207
See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added). See generally id. §§ 3612–14 (stating
that there are three entities with the power to enforce a FHA claim: the Secretary of HUD, the U.S.
Attorney General, and private persons).
208
Morningside Cmty. Org. v. Wayne Cty. Treasurer, No. 336430, 2017 WL 4182985, at *1 (Mich.
Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2017) (per curiam).
209
Perry v. Vernon Twp., 404 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Romulus City
Treasurer v. Wayne Cty. Drain Comm’r, 322 N.W.2d 152, 168 (Mich. 1982) (Levin, J., concurring)).
210
42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1).
211
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.30 (2013).
212
322 N.W.2d 103, 114 (Mich. 1982).
213
42 U.S.C. § 3613(c).
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injunctive relief and punitive damages,214 the Tax Tribunal has no power to
grant this type of relief, leaving plaintiffs at a severe disadvantage.215
Although the Michigan Court of Appeals decision has the three stated
downsides, it also may be a blessing in disguise for plaintiffs by giving them
a way into federal court, which has historically been more sympathetic to
antidiscrimination claims than Michigan courts.216 The Tax Injunction Act
will allow a state tax case into federal courts under a few narrow exceptions:
one being no “plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts
of such State.”217 By mandating all tax assessment-related cases go to the
Michigan Tax Tribunal—which cannot hear class actions—plaintiffs can
only file individual cases. There is no remedy in Michigan courts for
addressing property tax injustice that is pervasive and routinized.
In sum, Part II has articulated a comprehensive legal theory supporting
the claim that Wayne County’s racially discriminatory property tax
administration is a violation of the FHA. The remainder of the paper
empirically demonstrates that Wayne County’s tax assessment and
foreclosure practices disparately impact African-Americans.
III. METHODOLOGY
Data on property tax assessments, home sales, and race is required to
empirically investigate the racial impacts of unconstitutional tax assessments
in Wayne County. While significant data is available, some data are missing.
For instance, it is possible that both Detroit and Wayne County are violating
§ 3604 and § 3605 of the FHA. But, to investigate whether unconstitutional
tax assessments are disparately impacting African-Americans in the City of
Detroit, I would need to compare assessment ratios for African-Americans
with those of Whites in the City. This, however, would require data on the
race of each homeowner in Detroit linked to assessment data, which does not
exist. What I do have is census data, which provides a full sample of race at
the block level every ten years, and a smaller sample at the tract level every
year since 2005.218 But, since over 80% of Detroit’s population is African214

Id.
Morningside Cmty. Org. v. Wayne Cty. Treasurer, No. 336430, 2017 WL 4182985, at *3 (Mich.
Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2017) (per curiam) (noting that even though the Michigan Tax Tribunal lacked the
ability to issue injunctions, the remedy sought by the plaintiff, it did not limit the tribunal from having
exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims regarding the validity of property assessments).
216
Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530, 531, 537 (1989)
(discussing the preference of federal courts by plaintiffs in federal rights cases).
217
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
218
2010
Census,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/2010census
[https://perma.cc/TG33-NU8D]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Community Facts, AM. FACTFINDER,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml
[https://perma.cc/WB5W215
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American,219 there are very few majority white blocks that I can reliably
compare with majority black blocks.220 Even in the few affluent areas of
Detroit, Whites live alongside middle and upper-class African-Americans.
As a result, I cannot accurately examine whether Detroit’s Assessments
Division is unconstitutionally assessing African-American homeowners in
Detroit at a greater rate than white homeowners, given the limitations of the
data.
But, at the county level, it is possible to differentiate between majority
African-American and majority white cities because Wayne County—
composed of forty-three municipalities—is starkly stratified by race (see
Appendix Table 1A). African-Americans constitute the largest racial group
in Detroit, Inkster, Highland Park, Harper Woods, and River Rouge and form
a super majority (over 70% of the population) in Detroit, Inkster, and
Highland Park.221 In contrast, there are thirty-eight municipalities where
whites compose a majority and thirty-three where they constitute a
supermajority. There are only four municipalities where African-Americans
and whites live together in approximately equal numbers (meaning there is
a population difference of less than 10% between the two groups): River
Rouge, Harper Woods, Romulus, and Ecorse. For these reasons, this study
is able to analyze whether Wayne County has violated the FHA by failing to
use the equalization process to correct pervasive unconstitutional
assessments that adversely impact predominately African-American cities
and towns at a significantly greater rate than predominately white ones.
To determine if assessments in Wayne County violate the FHA, I
conducted an assessment ratio study (also known as sales ratio study or ratio
study) because this is the primary mechanism that taxpayers, assessors,
appeal boards, and taxing authorities use to determine if assessments satisfy

4ADS] (for tract data from 2010, search for Detroit City, Michigan, select Race and Hispanic Origin from
menu on left, then choose Compare Census Tracts for Race and Hispanic or Latino).
219
Race and other demographic information were obtained from the U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2015
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, AM. FACTFINDER, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/
nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml [https://perma.cc/267N-QYL2] (select American Community Survey “get
data” hyperlink, and then within the Advanced Search function, input “Wayne County, Michigan” and
“select results from “2015” to obtain the 2015 ACS 5-year estimates).
220
See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011)
(discussing judicial reliance and preference on quantitative analysis in determining discrimination);
Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L.
REV. 191 (2009) (discussing judicial trend of preference for near-identical comparators in discrimination
cases).
221
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 219.
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the legal requirements of a jurisdiction.222 An assessment ratio study is “a
form of applied statistics, because the analyst draws conclusions about the
appraisal of the population (the entire jurisdiction) of properties based only
on those that have sold during the given time period.”223 If the unsold parcels
are appraised in the same manner as the sold ones, then it is valid to use the
statistics derived from the sales ratio study to infer appraisal performance for
unsold parcels. The evidence shows that homes selling during the period
under study are comparable to homes that did not sell. For example, average
year built for all residential properties in Wayne County is 1948, and the
comparable figure for this study’s sample is 1956. Average building square
footage for all residential properties in Wayne County is 1,409, and the
comparable figure for this sample is 1,488.
Given Michigan’s constitutional requirement that assessments cannot
exceed 50% of a property’s market value, the overall assessment ratio—
which is a property’s assessed value divided by its market value—should
have a mean and median no higher than 0.5.224 If the ratios derived are
consistently higher than 0.5, then this is reliable evidence that, on average,
assessments are violating the Michigan Constitution. For reasons articulated
in the prior section, a violation of § 3604 and § 3605 of the FHA has occurred
if the data show that Wayne County’s predominantly African-American
cities experience unconstitutional tax assessments and property tax
foreclosure at a greater rate than its predominately white cities.
Since assessments in Michigan are calculated annually and are based
on property values from the previous year, I divided assessed values with
prior year sales information to produce assessment ratios. More specifically,
I calculated the annual median assessment ratios for each municipality based
on residential sale transactions occurring between January 1, 2012, and
August 27, 2015, and annual records of property assessments for 2013
through 2016. I secured these data from RealtyTrac—a well-known vendor
of foreclosure and real-estate transaction records. For properties that were
sold multiple times in the same calendar year, I took the last sale in a year as
the determinant of the property’s value. The full dataset includes 272,569
residential property transactions (I exclude empty lots and nontaxable
properties). The breakdown of data by year can be viewed in column (1) of
Table 1.

222
INT’L ASS’N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, STANDARD ON RATIO STUDIES 7 (2013),
http://www.iaao.org/media/standards/Standard_on_Ratio_Studies.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZQ3-FUSW]
[hereinafter STANDARD ON RATIO STUDIES].
223
Id. at 8.
224
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
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TABLE 1: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY YEAR OF SALE
Year

All Sales

Arm’s-Length
Sales

Trimmed
Arm’s-Length
Sales

% Trimmed

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

2012

82,834

10,524

9,826

6.63%

2013

79,362

11,926

11,474

3.79%

2014

70,463

6,248

6,078

2.79%

2015

39,910

6,641

6,433

3.13%

Total

272,569

35,339

33,811

4.32%

To ensure the most accurate estimates, I restricted the data used in the
analysis in several ways. First, as required by law, I limited the data
examined to “arm’s-length transactions,” which exclude transfers between
related parties, auction sales, and other similar nonmarket transactions.225
Second, I only included sales using warranty deeds, which is the typical deed
of transfer for arm’s-length transactions.226 Although the law states that only
arm’s-length transactions should be examined, there is an exception if
nonarm’s-length transactions (distressed sales) “have become a common
method of acquisition in the jurisdiction for the class of property being
valued.”227 Given that only about 13% of sales from 2012 to 2015 were
arm’s-length transactions (see Table 1), there is a strong argument that
distressed sales are, in fact, the common method of acquisition for residential
properties in certain Wayne County cities and towns. Nevertheless, I include
only arm’s length transactions in the analysis so that the resulting estimates
provide the most conservative measure of unconstitutionality. Scholars who
include distressed sales in their analysis will only find unconstitutionality
that is markedly more pronounced. Third, I excluded bundled properties—
different parcels with identical sellers, sale dates, and sale prices—because
it is impossible to determine the price of any single property within the
bundle. Fourth, I excluded properties that had a sale price of zero because it
is unlikely that these were arm’s-length transactions. I also excluded
properties with an assessed value equal to zero because these are likely to be
nontaxable properties.

225

RealtyTrac has a proprietary algorithm for identifying arm’s length transactions.
RICHARD R. POWELL, 14 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 81A.03[1](b)(i), at 81A–27 (Michael
Allan Wolf ed., 2017).
227
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.27(1) (2013).
226
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In total, I excluded 87% of the total observations, which may seem
extreme, but this is a result of the auctions and other non-arm’s-length
transactions that have proliferated in the distressed real estate markets of
several of Wayne County’s cities and towns. In addition, I further trimmed
the data in accordance with International Association of Assessing Officers’
(IAAO) nationally recognized standards, which recommend trimming the
sample of statistical outliers because very low or high ratios can severely
distort the analysis.228 I show the total observations after trimming in column
(3) of Table 1, and the percentage of trimmed observations in column (4).
The number of observations I excluded from the sample due to outlier
trimming is below the IAAO’s recommended limit of 10%.229
IV. DATA ANALYSIS
The data convincingly show that property tax administration in Wayne
County has led predominately African-American cities and towns to
experience property tax foreclosures and unconstitutional tax assessments at
a greater rate than predominately white ones. To demonstrate this, I pose two
specific research questions:
The first question is whether the facially neutral property tax
foreclosure practices in Wayne County have led predominately AfricanAmerican cities and towns to experience property tax foreclosures at a
greater rate than predominately white ones. As shown in Appendix Table
2A, there are six cities with a property tax foreclosure rate that exceeds 10
per 1,000 properties: Highland Park (235), Detroit (153), Inkster (46), Ecorse
(39), River Rouge (16), Hamtramck (13). From this list, Hamtramck is the
only city where African-Americans do not constitute a significant portion of
the population—they account for only 13% of residents.230 In the other cities,
228
STANDARD ON RATIO STUDIES, supra note 222, at 53. The IAAO defines an outlier as an
assessment ratio below the first quartile or above the third quartile by 1.5 times the interquartile range
(IQR), where the IQR is the difference between the first and third quartiles. The first quartile is the median
value of the lower half of the data and the third quartile is the median value of the upper half of the data
(the second quartile is the median of the entire dataset). The IAAO also recognizes that ratio distributions
are often skewed to the right (i.e., a greater number of high ratios may be present), so to prevent dropping
a disproportionate number of high ratios, the IAAO suggests taking the logarithm of each assessment
ratio prior to trimming the outliers. Id. at 41, 53. Steps I took for trimming outliers: 1) Locate the first
quartile (i.e., median value of the lower half of the data), 2) Locate the third quartile (i.e., median value
of the upper half of the data), 3) Compute the interquartile range (IQR) and multiply by 1.5 = (Step 2 –
Step 1) x 1.5, 4) Establish the Lower Boundary = (Step 1 – Step 3), and 5) Establish the Upper boundary
= (Step 2 + Step 3).
229
Id. at 54.
230
It is important to understand that while Hamtramck’s residents are classified as white in the
census, it is a community dominated by Arab immigrants, many of whom are economically and socially
vulnerable. Sarah Pulliam Bailey, In the First Majority-Muslim U.S. City, Residents Tense About Its
Future, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/for-the-first-majority-
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anywhere between 45% to 92% of the population is African-American (see
Appendix Table 1A). As such, the data clearly show that Wayne County’s
predominately African-American cities are disparately impacted by property
tax foreclosures.231
The second question is whether Wayne County’s failure to properly
equalize the assessments has caused predominately African-American cities
and towns to experience unconstitutional tax assessments at a greater rate
than predominately white ones. According to the Michigan Constitution, the
assessment ratio for each property cannot exceed 0.50;232 so when the median
assessment ratio for any municipality is 0.60 and above, it is certain that the
assessed values in that jurisdiction are systematically violating the Michigan
Constitution by a significant margin. That is, there is no debate as to whether
unconstitutional assessments dominate a jurisdiction when the average
assessment ratio is 0.60.
As shown in Appendix Table 3A, there are eight municipalities that fall
within this category (listed in descending order of assessment ratio): Ecorse,
River Rouge, Inkster, Hamtramck, Detroit, Dearborn, Highland Park, and
Lincoln Park. Wayne County residents are subject to severely
unconstitutional assessments in all three municipalities with a supermajority
of African-Americans and four of the five municipalities where AfricanAmericans are the majority. Of the thirty-three municipalities where Whites
compose a supermajority, only two (Dearborn and Lincoln Park) are among
the municipalities subjecting its residents to routine and severe
unconstitutional assessments; and only four of the thirty-eight municipalities
where whites constitute a majority.

muslim-us-city-residents-tense-about-its-future/2015/11/21/45d0ea96-8a24-11e5-be390034bb576eee_story.html [https://perma.cc/Z9XM-R57C].
231
Most significantly, my forthcoming study with Professor Berry estimates that 10% of all tax
foreclosures were caused by illegally inflated tax assessments. See Atuahene & Berry, supra note 23.
Moreover, since lower priced homes were overassessed at a greater frequency and magnitude than
higher priced homes, we estimate that 25% of tax foreclosures among homes less than $8,000 in sale
price were due to unconstitutional property tax assessments. Id.
232
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
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TABLE 2: ASSESSMENT RATIOS BY RACIAL POPULATION OF WAYNE COUNTY
MUNICIPALITIES233
Percentage Black
in Municipality
0–33% Black
34–66% Black
67–100% Black
Total

Ratio .5 and
below
24
0
0
24

Ratio above
.5 and below
.6
8
3
0
11

Ratio .6 and
above

Total

3
2
3
8

35
5
3
43

As shown in Table 2, there are twenty-four municipalities where the
median assessment ratio is 0.50 or below and every one of these jurisdictions
is majority white. Again, the evidence is clear: African-Americans are
disparately impacted by unconstitutional tax assessments occurring in
Wayne County.
FIGURE 2: ASSESSMENT RATIOS BY RACIAL POPULATION OF WAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES

233
For more information on the assessment ratios for each municipality in Wayne
County stratified by racial population, see infra Appendix Table 4A.
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Based on Figure 2, it is clear that there is a correlation between
jurisdictions that severely unconstitutionally assess their residents and the
race of those residents. But, there may be factors other than race driving these
correlations. For instance, counties may be more likely to endure
unconstitutional assessments if they experience a precipitous drop in housing
values because their assessment division did not have the capacity to adjust
market valuations in a timely manner. Consequently, the next step is to
determine whether the correlation between race and unconstitutional
assessments persists even after accounting for severe declines in home
values. To do this, I sorted municipalities into two categories: those that had
the most severe home price declines between 2005 and 2013 (i.e., they were
in the bottom quartile) and those that did not.234 During this period, the
bottom quartile consists of properties that declined 53% or more.
The municipalities in the bottom quartile, where the decline in home
prices was particularly severe include: Ecorse, River Rouge, Inkster,
Hamtramck, Detroit, Lincoln Park, Wayne, Melvindale, Harper Woods,
Redford, and Taylor. This list includes four of the thirty-three supermajority
white municipalities; two of the three supermajority African-American
municipalities; six of the thirty-eight predominately white municipalities;
and four of the five predominately African-American municipalities. These
data show that predominately African-American municipalities were
disparately impacted by severe declines in housing values. In addition, with
the exception of two (Redford and Taylor, both predominantly white), all
municipalities that experienced significant declines in housing values had
median assessment ratios of 0.55 or above.
But, as shown in Table 3, among the eleven municipalities that
experienced significant declines in their housing values, only six were
subject to assessments that substantially violated the Michigan Constitution
(0.60 or above): River Rouge, Ecorse, Inkster, Hamtramck, Detroit, and
Lincoln Park. Among the six are two of the three municipalities with a
supermajority of African-Americans, but only one of the thirty-three
municipalities where whites constitute a supermajority. Also, only two
among the six municipalities (Hamtramck and Lincoln Park) have a
population that is less than 40% African-American.

234
Using all arm’s-length transactions for each municipality, I calculated the change in the median
home sale price from 2005 to 2013.
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TABLE 3: UNCONSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENTS AMONG MUNICIPALITIES WHERE THERE WAS A
>50% CHANGE IN HOME SALE PRICES
City

Median
Ratio

Median
Home

% White

% Black

% Price
Change

Price
Population
Predominantly Black
River Rouge city

1.25

15,000

40%

53%

-75%

Inkster city

0.82

26,000

21%

74%

-73%

Harper Woods city

0.57

36,100

40%

55%

-69%

Detroit city

0.76

24,000

13%

80%

-64%

Ecorse city

1.25

15,000

47%

45%

-77%

Redford charter
township

0.53

50,000

61%

35%

-63%

Melvindale city

0.58

41,000

73%

16%

-62%

Hamtramck city

0.81

20,500

55%

14%

-62%

Wayne city

0.59

53,003

81%

15%

-59%

Lincoln Park city

0.60

46,000

85%

6%

-57%

Taylor city

0.50

65,000

77%

16%

-54%

Population
Predominantly White

In addition, research shows that assessment divisions are more likely to
incorrectly appraise lower-valued homes, so home value is another factor
that is correlated with unconstitutional assessments. Accordingly, it is
possible that instead of race, low home values explain the concentration of
unconstitutional assessments in certain municipalities. In order to determine
whether unconstitutional assessments persisted after accounting for home
prices, I sorted municipalities into two categories: homes valued at or below
$51,501 (i.e., homes in the bottom quartile of median home sale prices) and
homes valued above $51,501. In order to simplify the presentation of the
data, however, I used $50,000 as the threshold for categorizing
municipalities with low home prices.235

235

The results were no different when I used $51,501 versus $50,000.
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TABLE 4: UNCONSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENTS AMONG MUNICIPALITIES WHERE MEDIAN HOME
PRICE LEVEL IS IN THE BOTTOM QUARTILE
City

Median
Ratio

Median
Home $

White

%

% Black

River Rouge city

1.25

15,000

40%

53%

Inkster city

0.82

26,000

21%

74%

Detroit city

0.76

24,000

13%

80%

Highland Park city

0.60

25,748

4%

92%

Harper Woods city

0.57

36,100

40%

55%

Ecorse city

1.25

15,000

47%

45%

Hamtramck city

0.81

20,500

55%

14%

Lincoln Park city

0.60

46,000

85%

6%

Melvindale city

0.58

41,000

73%

16%

Population Predominantly
Black

Population Predominantly
White

The full list of municipalities that have median home prices below
$50,000 includes nine municipalities: Ecorse, River Rouge, Inkster,
Hamtramck, Detroit, Highland Park, Lincoln Park, Melvindale, and Harper
Woods. This list includes five of the five predominately African-American
municipalities; three of the three municipalities with a supermajority of
African-Americans; four of the thirty-eight predominately white
municipalities, and two of the thirty-three municipalities with a
supermajority of whites (see Table 4). In sum, cities and towns where
African-Americans predominate are more likely to have median home sale
prices below $50,000. Also, there is a correlation between cities that have a
low median home price and unconstitutional assessments because none of
the nine municipalities with a median home price of $50,000 or below has
an assessment ratio below 0.55; and seven of nine have a ratio of 0.60 or
above. Of the seven municipalities that have low median home prices and
are severely unconstitutionally assessing its residents, only two have a
population that is below 45% African-American.
In sum, I have presented strong evidence that cities with a population
that is predominantly African-American suffer from unconstitutional
property tax assessments and tax foreclosures at a higher rate than cities that
are predominately white. But, more than majority-white cities,
predominately African-American cities have experienced sharp declines in
1552
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housing values and low homes prices—two factors that are highly correlated
with an increased incidence of unconstitutional property tax assessments.
That is, while a statistical disparity between predominately white and black
cities exists without question, race is not the only factor causing the
discrepancy. As a consequence, this Essay has not established causation, but
rather it has established a strong correlation between unconstitutional
assessments, foreclosure, and race.
CONCLUSION
Wayne County’s failure to properly equalize property tax assessments
between its local taxing units most acutely affects localities where
assessments are systematically in violation of the Michigan Constitution and
thus most in need of correction. The evidence presented shows that
predominately African-American cities in Wayne County experience
unconstitutional tax assessments and tax foreclosure at a far greater rate than
predominately white cities. Consequently, Wayne County’s equalization
policy disparately impacts African-Americans in violation of § 3604 and
§ 3605 of the FHA.
I opened this Essay with Mrs. B’s story. Investors purchased her home
from the Wayne County Property Tax Auction for $500 and have recently
evicted Mrs. B. So, even if the FHA class action lawsuit had been successful,
she would not have gotten her house back.236 If, however, a future lawsuit
forces Wayne County to properly monitor and prevent unconstitutional
assessments in its taxing jurisdictions, then the real potential winners are
homeowners in Wayne County’s predominately African-American cities
who are still in their homes, but vulnerable to tax injustice and foreclosure.
There should never be anyone who is unconstitutionally assessed and
foreclosed upon because they were subject to inflated property tax bills that
they could not afford to pay. What happened to Mrs. B and so many other
African-Americans in Wayne County should never happen again.

236

See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (2012).
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1A: SELECTED POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS FOR WAYNE COUNTY
MUNICIPALITIES, 2015
KEY
1: % White alone

2: % Black alone

3: Median household
income

4: Per capita income

5: Poverty rate

6: Unemployment rate

7: Owner-occupancy rate

8: Housing vacancy rate

9: Median value owneroccupied housing

Source: 2015 American Community Survey 5-year estimates237
Place

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Allen Park city

93.9

2.0

63007

29066

6.8

7.7

85.2

6.7

95500

Belleville city

91.7

6.7

45452

24968

16.3

7.7

57.6

12.2

107900

83.8

7.1

70095

29945

8.7

6.5

77.9

7.6

155900

71.7

9.2

83943

35646

5.5

6.6

75.8

5.4

196200

90.1

3.7

47375

21535

28.9

9.9

67.3

9.7

105800

84.3

8.6

44620

21671

20.1

11.4

74.1

7.3

82500

Detroit city

13.4

80.1

25764

15038

40.3

24.9

49.4

30.0

42300

Ecorse city

46.9

44.8

28131

15449

33.1

24.6

57.6

24.0

40400

Flat Rock city

90.0

7.6

56700

26296

12.7

8.6

74.8

9.5

110100

Garden City city

94.3

2.3

49862

23560

10.9

9.0

81.5

7.6

80500

Gibraltar city

95.4

2.2

66477

27539

11.9

10.7

79.4

15.6

99400

95.7

0.6

93114

45512

3.1

4.3

88.3

5.7

243600

92.3

1.0

98578

59949

2.8

6.5

79.2

8.5

263200

94.8

2.7

115918

53485

3.8

5.1

97.4

6.3

268500

85.9

10.2

95179

53249

6.1

5.4

73.8

10.1

291000

90.8

4.9

92014

42524

4.6

5.7

87.3

6.2

188300

Brownstown
charter township
Canton charter
township
Dearborn city
Dearborn Heights
city

Grosse Ile
township
Grosse Pointe
city
Grosse Pointe
Farms city
Grosse Pointe
Park city
Grosse Pointe
Woods city
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55.2

14.4

23759

10557

47.3

17.4

48.3

23.4

41900

39.9

54.7

48820

21694

13.5

12.2

62.1

13.6

64800

4.0

92.1

17250

14437

49.3

32.0

36.0

33.9

36000

92.9

2.9

73000

29323

10.4

9.3

88.1

4.9

163000

Inkster city

20.7

74.3

30210

15843

34.9

16.8

51.7

16.9

49100

Lincoln Park city

84.8

6.2

41090

20105

19.9

12.0

69.9

10.5

58700

Livonia city

91.7

3.6

70125

33082

5.8

6.4

84.4

5.2

156100

Melvindale city

72.8

15.7

33081

17149

27.1

11.6

60.1

9.0

54300

Northville city

93.0

0.7

86397

64841

9.1

9.3

60.7

9.7

313000

78.8

3.3

102964

54552

3.2

4.2

76.4

5.6

341800

92.8

2.1

75949

43316

5.9

4.7

60.9

7.6

224300

91.7

2.0

77248

42184

4.8

4.9

81.5

4.4

249400

60.8

34.5

49816

22887

16.5

12.9

76.8

8.6

63600

River Rouge city

40.1

53.0

26230

14360

41.4

26.0

57.1

27.6

34100

Riverview city

91.1

5.7

49796

26078

13.4

7.1

62.7

6.8

117200

Rockwood city

93.7

0.3

51250

28078

9.5

7.5

69.0

8.2

112600

Romulus city

49.3

42.6

42681

19270

20.5

15.3

64.6

9.1

69400

Southgate city

87.6

5.5

50280

26042

11.1

9.2

63.9

7.0

84900

87.7

9.2

53153

26015

22.0

7.9

88.5

12.3

123800

Taylor city

76.7

16.5

40545

20351

21.9

14.4

65.5

8.4

72500

Trenton city

95.5

2.1

55218

29098

8.0

5.7

79.0

4.7

118000

65.2

28.7

55309

28652

11.3

8.7

65.1

9.7

124400

94.3

1.1

139954

86153

1.4

4.6

92.5

5.4

410300

Wayne city

80.6

15.3

39352

20030

22.8

10.1

56.6

10.9

64700

Westland city

73.5

18.9

44641

24831

15.8

9.2

59.6

8.3

90900

Woodhaven city

90.7

4.4

55266

30201

6.5

8.4

70.7

6.0

131000

Wyandotte city

95.2

1.1

51237

27219

11.1

10.3

73.1

9.6

84800

Harper Woods
city
Highland Park
city
Huron charter
township

Northville
township
Plymouth city
Plymouth charter
township
Redford charter
township

Sumpter
township

Van Buren
charter township
Village of Grosse
Pointe Shores
city
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TABLE 2A: RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX FORECLOSURE RATE BY WAYNE COUNTY
MUNICIPALITY,
2013–2016
Place

Tax
Foreclosures

Residential
Properties

Foreclosure Rate
(per 1,000 properties)

Allen Park city

4

11,420

0.35

Belleville city

1

920

1.09

Brownstown charter
township

2

9,313

0.21

Dearborn Heights city

41

21,805

1.88

Detroit city

34,470

224,940

153.24

Ecorse city

123

3,141

39.16

Garden City city

17

10,757

1.58

Gibraltar city

1

1,443

0.69

Grosse Pointe Woods city

4

6,468

0.62

Hamtramck city

11

824

13.35

Harper Woods city

8

3,469

2.31

Highland Park city

668

2,840

235.21

1

3,465

0.29

Inkster city

208

4,557

45.64

Lincoln Park city

106

14,042

7.55

Livonia city

8

34,323

0.23

Melvindale city

19

3,637

5.22

Plymouth charter township

1

9,547

0.10

Redford charter township

39

19,576

1.99

River Rouge city

35

2,196

15.94

Riverview city

3

3,637

0.82

Romulus city

27

6,820

3.96

Southgate city

13

10,036

1.30

Sumpter township

3

2,486

1.21

Taylor city

5

1,546

3.23

Trenton city

2

5,932

0.34

Van Buren charter
township

3

6,533

0.46

Wayne city

17

5,288

3.21

Westland city

43

25,728

1.67

Wyandotte city

3

3,654

0.82

Huron charter township
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TABLE 3A: ASSESSMENT RATIO DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY WAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPALITY
AND YEAR
Place

Allen Park city

Belleville city

Brownstown charter
township

Canton charter
township

Dearborn Heights city

Dearborn city

Detroit city

Year

Median
Ratio

Median
Sale
Price

% > 0.50

N

2013

0.51

75,000

0.50

252

2014

0.47

85,950

0.36

332

2015

0.47

95,030

0.39

186

2016

0.45

102,500

0.31

183

Overall

0.48

87,900

0.39

953

2013

0.49

113,900

0.47

17

2014

0.55

114,750

0.62

24

2015

0.53

149,000

0.60

15

2016

0.48

121,500

0.35

26

Overall

0.50

116,500

0.50

82

2013

0.50

155,000

0.46

197

2014

0.50

169,500

0.34

193

2015

0.50

169,000

0.49

111

2016

0.50

171,250

0.32

118

Overall

0.50

165,000

0.40

619

2013

0.49

199,900

0.38

617

2014

0.46

219,000

0.21

751

2015

0.47

220,000

0.26

355

2016

0.49

224,700

0.40

395

Overall

0.48

215,000

0.30

2,118

2013

0.67

63,050

0.84

600

2014

0.56

74,250

0.64

711

2015

0.50

85,500

0.50

357

2016

0.52

83,500

0.54

410

Overall

0.56

73,000

0.65

2,078

2013

0.86

42,500

0.89

18

2014

0.62

75,000

0.83

12

2015

0.68

58,500

1.00

6

2016

0.71

50,000

0.80

5

Overall

0.71

50,000

0.88

41

2013

1.07

18,000

0.83

3,015
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Ecorse city

Flat Rock city

Garden City city

Gibraltar city

Grosse Ile township

Grosse Pointe Farms
city

Grosse Pointe Park city

1558

2014

0.80

25,000

0.76

3,248

2015

0.57

26,000

0.55

1,861

2016

0.51

29,000

0.50

1,608

Overall

0.76

24,000

0.70

9,732

2013

1.90

12,000

0.96

27

2014

1.67

12,200

1.00

27

2015

0.92

15,900

0.81

16

2016

0.68

20,000

0.58

24

Overall

1.25

15,000

0.85

94

2013

0.54

145,000

0.60

53

2014

0.51

107,465

0.52

67

2015

0.51

117,750

0.54

46

2016

0.48

140,500

0.40

30

Overall

0.51

120,000

0.53

196

2013

0.58

56,750

0.64

238

2014

0.50

70,317

0.49

283

2015

0.48

79,250

0.41

132

2016

0.47

84,000

0.39

187

Overall

0.50

70,500

0.50

840

2013

0.47

170,000

0.40

25

2014

0.51

170,000

0.51

35

2015

0.50

101,200

0.45

20

2016

0.49

140,717

0.48

23

Overall

0.49

140,717

0.47

103

2013

0.53

212,000

0.55

115

2014

0.50

223,500

0.48

126

2015

0.49

235,750

0.42

84

2016

0.49

232,500

0.35

77

Overall

0.50

228,000

0.46

402

2013

0.50

207,500

0.49

151

2014

0.45

260,000

0.32

185

2015

0.45

280,000

0.30

91

2016

0.48

305,000

0.41

100

Overall

0.48

255,000

0.38

527

2013

0.54

259,000

0.66
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Grosse Pointe Woods
city

Grosse Pointe city

Hamtramck city

Harper Woods city

Highland Park city

Huron charter township

Inkster city

"Our Taxes Are Too Damn High"
2014

0.50

230,000

0.47

161

2015

0.51

267,500

0.51

82

2016

0.49

260,000

0.45

89

Overall

0.52

250,000

0.53

463

2013

0.51

149,500

0.54

200

2014

0.45

165,000

0.30

230

2015

0.48

172,750

0.39

124

2016

0.49

187,250

0.45

133

Overall

0.48

165,000

0.41

687

2013

0.49

207,000

0.46

71

2014

0.46

265,000

0.38

76

2015

0.50

283,750

0.42

52

2016

0.49

237,000

0.41

37

Overall

0.48

237,450

0.42

236

2013

1.23

14,500

0.85

20

2014

0.80

20,000

0.95

21

2015

0.73

29,900

0.69

13

2016

0.74

27,000

0.75

12

Overall

0.80

20,500

0.83

66

2013

0.67

28,750

0.76

124

2014

0.59

34,750

0.66

148

2015

0.53

45,000

0.57

83

2016

0.52

42,000

0.55

119

Overall

0.57

36,100

0.64

474

2013

2.60

6,950

0.86

14

2014

0.45

45,000

0.43

37

2015

0.36

49,900

0.25

8

2016

0.53

46,500

0.57

7

Overall

0.60

25,748

0.52

66

2013

0.52

151,000

0.63

43

2014

0.48

145,000

0.44

71

2015

0.49

165,000

0.44

25

2016

0.51

159,950

0.53

38

Overall

0.51

155,000

0.50

177

2013

1.60

18,000

0.96

79
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Lincoln Park city

Livonia city

Melvindale city

Northville city

Northville township

Plymouth charter
township

Plymouth city
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2014

0.95

24,000

0.91

95

2015

0.65

31,500

0.70

86

2016

0.36

47,250

0.33

79

Overall

0.82

26,000

0.73

339

2013

0.79

37,000

0.88

252

2014

0.59

46,100

0.67

297

2015

0.56

49,000

0.61

176

2016

0.48

58,000

0.45

219

Overall

0.60

46,000

0.66

944

2013

0.49

133,250

0.37

726

2014

0.48

145,500

0.24

873

2015

0.48

152,000

0.33

397

2016

0.49

165,000

0.37

508

Overall

0.49

148,000

0.32

2,504

2013

0.76

31,500

0.88

60

2014

0.57

38,000

0.61

61

2015

0.53

45,000

0.55

33

2016

0.48

50,700

0.44

52

Overall

0.58

41,000

0.64

206

2013

0.47

225,000

0.30

44

2014

0.44

262,500

0.32

38

2015

0.46

309,500

0.31

16

2016

0.49

387,500

0.46

26

Overall

0.46

289,500

0.34

124

2013

0.49

436,000

0.33

252

2014

0.48

450,000

0.27

285

2015

0.48

525,500

0.28

105

2016

0.50

447,950

0.43

124

Overall

0.48

450,000

0.31

766

2013

0.48

215,000

0.37

277

2014

0.46

280,000

0.22

349

2015

0.49

295,500

0.39

180

2016

0.50

250,000

0.48

187

Overall

0.48

252,500

0.34

993

2013

0.48

170,000

0.38

127
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Redford charter
township

River Rouge city

Riverview city

Rockwood city

Romulus city

Southgate city

Sumpter township

"Our Taxes Are Too Damn High"
2014

0.46

220,000

0.29

159

2015

0.47

222,500

0.34

71

2016

0.50

259,900

0.42

73

Overall

0.47

215,000

0.35

430

2013

0.63

40,000

0.72

562

2014

0.53

48,000

0.56

657

2015

0.49

56,000

0.47

357

2016

0.46

63,750

0.39

371

Overall

0.53

50,000

0.56

1,947

2013

1.87

9,300

1.00

20

2014

1.16

15,000

0.90

20

2015

0.94

16,500

0.93

14

2016

0.41

37,125

0.40

10

Overall

1.25

15,000

0.86

64

2013

0.53

100,000

0.59

75

2014

0.45

138,500

0.30

88

2015

0.52

146,000

0.62

34

2016

0.49

118,500

0.46

50

Overall

0.49

120,000

0.46

247

2013

0.52

82,600

0.56

27

2014

0.48

97,500

0.41

22

2015

0.48

113,000

0.42

12

2016

0.50

102,500

0.44

9

Overall

0.50

97,000

0.47

70

2013

0.62

59,450

0.75

114

2014

0.55

61,000

0.58

133

2015

0.51

72,500

0.51

77

2016

0.50

73,000

0.47

90

Overall

0.54

65,000

0.59

414

2013

0.55

69,900

0.59

208

2014

0.51

78,050

0.54

294

2015

0.50

82,500

0.49

134

2016

0.49

84,550

0.46

158

Overall

0.51

78,700

0.53

794

2013

0.54

110,000

0.58

31
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Taylor city

Trenton city

Van Buren charter
township

Village of Grosse
Pointe Shores city

Wayne city

Westland city

Woodhaven city
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2014

0.52

129,375

0.56

43

2015

0.53

155,000

0.71

14

2016

0.45

167,500

0.40

15

Overall

0.52

137,000

0.56

103

2013

0.58

60,000

0.62

26

2014

0.55

62,000

0.55

40

2015

0.48

84,750

0.38

24

2016

0.46

84,500

0.35

26

Overall

0.50

65,000

0.48

116

2013

0.54

110,000

0.65

107

2014

0.47

125,000

0.32

146

2015

0.47

134,950

0.33

72

2016

0.51

127,250

0.53

106

Overall

0.49

123,500

0.46

431

2013

0.51

155,000

0.54

126

2014

0.46

170,500

0.33

148

2015

0.49

193,000

0.35

77

2016

0.51

180,500

0.51

80

Overall

0.49

173,450

0.43

431

2013

0.50

380,000

0.48

29

2014

0.47

380,000

0.37

35

2015

0.47

432,000

0.47

17

2016

0.48

432,500

0.42

19

Overall

0.48

395,000

0.43

100

2013

0.83

39,000

0.90

93

2014

0.62

49,950

0.69

132

2015

0.56

59,250

0.61

70

2016

0.46

64,000

0.37

79

Overall

0.59

53,003

0.66

374

2013

0.54

69,000

0.61

516

2014

0.48

84,000

0.41

628

2015

0.48

87,700

0.40

349

2016

0.48

103,400

0.38

421

Overall

0.49

83,500

0.46

1,914

2013

0.47

129,900

0.30

60

112:1501 (2018)

Wyandotte city

"Our Taxes Are Too Damn High"
2014

0.46

134,000

0.33

75

2015

0.47

147,500

0.30

44

2016

0.48

150,000

0.33

55

Overall

0.47

139,700

0.32

234

2013

0.53

66,000

0.61

87

2014

0.51

82,200

0.52

118

2015

0.46

76,500

0.38

52

2016

0.48

94,000

0.40

55

Overall

0.50

76,500

0.50

312

TABLE 4A: ASSESSMENT RATIO AND RACIAL POPULATION FOR WAYNE COUNTY
MUNICIPALITIES
Place

% White

% Black

Ratio

Allen Park city

93.9

2.0

.48

Belleville city

91.7

6.7

.5

Brownstown charter township

83.8

7.1

.5

Canton charter township

71.7

9.2

.48

Dearborn city

90.1

3.7

.56

Dearborn Heights city

84.3

8.6

.71

Detroit city

13.4

80.1

.76

Ecorse city

46.9

44.8

1.25

Flat Rock city

90.0

7.6

.51

Garden City city

94.3

2.3

.5

Gibraltar city

95.4

2.2

.49

Grosse Ile township

95.7

0.6

.5

Grosse Pointe city

92.3

1.0

.48

Grosse Pointe Farms city

94.8

2.7

.48

Grosse Pointe Park city

85.9

10.2

.52

Grosse Pointe Woods city

90.8

4.9

.48

Hamtramck city

55.2

14.4

.8

Harper Woods city

39.9

54.7

.57

Highland Park city

4.0

92.1

.6

Huron charter township

92.9

2.9

.51

Inkster city

20.7

74.3

.82
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Lincoln Park city

84.8

6.2

.6

Livonia city

91.7

3.6

.49

Melvindale city

72.8

15.7

.58

Northville city

93.0

0.7

.46

Northville township

78.8

3.3

.48

Plymouth city

92.8

2.1

.48

Plymouth charter township

91.7

2.0

.47

Redford charter township

60.8

34.5

.53

River Rouge city

40.1

53.0

1.25

Riverview city

91.1

5.7

.49

Rockwood city

93.7

0.3

.5

Romulus city

49.3

42.6

.54

Southgate city

87.6

5.5

.51

Sumpter township

87.7

9.2

.52

Taylor city

76.7

16.5

.5

Trenton city

95.5

2.1

.49

Van Buren charter township

65.2

28.7

.49

Village of Grosse Pointe Shores city

94.3

1.1

.48

Wayne city

80.6

15.3

.59

Westland city

73.5

18.9

.49

Woodhaven city

90.7

4.4

.47

Wyandotte city

95.2

1.1

.50
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